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CHAPTER ONE 
SPEECH COMMUNICATION AND 
THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY 
2 
In recent years the field of speech communication has 
reached out to embrace the findings and methods of the behavioral 
sciences, sometimes in haste, sometimes very effectively, but always 
with the conviction that communication, the core human behavior, 
ought to be conceptualized and studied "behavioristically" as well 
as "humanistically. " 
The study of personality psychology has been an area 
especially intriguing and useful to speech communication scholars. 
In part, this has been due to the ability of personality psychology 
to offer neat and precise explanations of many patterns of behavior 
which communication research has begun to discover. For example, 
the susceptibility of audiences to fear appeals in messages is 
clearly related to the idea that some personalities may be character-
ized as high or low in "chronic anxiety. " The impact of perceived 
credibility of a message source would no doubt be affected by the 
tendency of some personalities to rely heavily on authority figures. 
A strong need to be included., in others' activities is clearly related 
to conformity behavior in groups, Acceptance of complex or two-
sided messages must take into account high and low levels of tolerance 
for ambiguity. In these and countless other ways, the claimed ability 
of personality psychology to offer systematic explanations of apparent 
patterns in communication behavior has made it a very important 
resource area for speech communication writers and researchers. 
But there is no doubt another reason for the interest in 
personality psychology among scholars in various fields including our 
own. It is that personality theorists have gone beyond the complex 
and technical conceptualizing and research that is part of any 
serious behavioral study to produce a product which is neither 
complex nor ambiguous or difficult to use; the personality test. 
Now it is possible for almost anyone to bypass the process of theory 
building and instrument validation, and simply buy or copy the 
pencil-and-paper test instrument which is the product of personality 
research. It is then a simple matter to administer it to a group 
of subjects or students or members or clients or appl~cants, score the 
test, compare results to a widely published set of "norms," and pro-
nounce the test takers to be high or low in the personality trait 
"measured" by the test. What is done with this information is then 
left to the person administering the test. The information may be 
used in predicting experimental results, screening job applicants, 
placing students in instructional groups or levels, or planning 
therapy. Thus speech communication researchers and teachers, with a 
certain eagerness to get on with the catch-up work of embracing the 
behavioral sciences, have found in the psychology of personality a 
remarkably unambiguous and useful resource which assures them that 
people are predictable, that they are guid~d by remarkably stable 
patterns called "traits" which they follow consistently across situa-
tions, and not least, that these traits can be measured quickly and 
easily by a written test. 
However, it is also very important to the field of speech 
communication to know if something is wrong with this scenario. It 
is the purpose of this study to report on and test a major line of 
inquiry which posits that something is very wrong with the entire 
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paradigm of personality as we have received and accepted it from 
trait theorists. In the face of the view that personality traits 
form a permanent structure which circumscribes and motivates consis-
tent patterns of behavior in all situations, the emerging challenge 
denies that people behave consistently across situations, and 
reinterprets personality to be a style of interpreting environmental 
cues. 
A group of theorists, led by Walter Mischel of Stanford 
University, has advanced the "social learning" perspective which 
views personality not as structural or permanent or independent of 
environmental cues, but as interactive with situations. Specifically, 
these theorists believe that "differences in persons" or "personality 
differences" should be conceptualized as differences in styles of 
interpreting the demands of situations relative to behavior. These 
differences in persons may influence behavior heavily if situational 
demands are weak or ambiguous, or their influence on behavior may be 
relatively weak if situations make strong demands. Not only is this 
view at odds with the psychodynamic trait theories which see differ-
ences in persons as permanent, producing measurable behavior differ-
ences across all situations; in addition, the social learning view is 
an indictment of the trait conceptualization. It charges that trait 
psychology is a special case of stereotyping which has been legiti-
mized by a series of impressive tests whose validity and utility is 
highly questionable. 
If this counter-paradigm prevails, it too will have important 
implications for the field of speech communication and the assumptions 
in which we have believed. 
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If the social learning theorists are correct, the personality 
assessment tests on which much communication research depends, and 
the rationale for those tests on which much communication theory 
rests, no longer would be considered valid. If the single most 
extensive review of literature of the whole area of personality is 
taken seriously, the predictive value of measured personality traits 
is very low. And if the foremost defender of the new paradigm has his 
way, we shall have to realize that in characterizing persons as behav-
ing consistently across situations we have engaged in stereotypical 
oversimplifications which say nothing accurate, valid, or useful 
about the person characterized. On the other hand, these stereotypes 
or "thumbnail sketches" of persons ( to use Mischel' s faintly derisive 
term) may say a great deal about those of us who have done the pro-
jecting and stereotyping and legitimized it all by uncritical use of 
readily available pencil-and-paper tests. 
The counter-view to be presented here suggests a way of look-
ing at personality which tentatively identifies "person variables" 
which replace th~ trait notion with a set of categories in which 
persons interpret the constraints of environmental stimuli. To the 
speech communication field this promises a possible way of strategi-
cally manipulating communication settings and messages to achieve 
desired responses. The new focus on people's interpretation of 
situations as predictors of behavior and the attendant skepticism 
regarding the search for the roots of behavior in "inner states" 
might provide significant input to the associated ~uestion of how 
attitudes and behavior relate The new approach to personality 
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research which reduces radically the ratio of subject N to experi-
menter may suggest new techniques of research useful in experimental 
studies in speech communication. The potential payoff might include 
methods for embedding experiments in real-life, fam~liar situations, 
subjects who knowingly cooperate in an experiment they understand, 
results which are far more probabJe and accurate, and an increasingly 
sophisticated technology for eliciting accurate assessment of 
subjects' responses to situation and manipulations, All these and 
perhaps more benefits are possible to the speech communication 
researcher and theorist if the new paradigm prevails, 
. . 
But by far the most important justification for a dissertation 
in speech communication focused on personality is the theoretical 
issue of what is personality, how does it relate to the environment, 
how should it be assessed, and how does it relate to communication 
behavior. Because students of communication have assumed that these 
questions were to some extent answered,'it is all the more important 
' now that a challenge to that conceptualization has been raised, to 
respond to it, This dissertation is an attempt to respond with an 
explanation of the challenge, awareness of its substance, a recognition 
of its il!lPortance, and an experimental study which is one of the first 
direct tests of its theoretical base. 
In Chapter Tw'o we shall examine theoretical and experimental 
research relevant to the defenders and reconceptua.lizers of traditional 
personality theories. The dogmatism theory of Milton Rokea.ch will be 
developed as a case-in-point of trait theory&, this trait construct 
sees persons as possessing a structural feature of personality which 
determines the type and sequencing of judgments a.bout new information, 
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Dogmatism bears directly on the question of whether persons will 
accept or reject messages. Then Chapter Two will trace the develop-
ment of the social learning paradigm of personality. Included in 
this review of literature will be an attempt to follow systematically 
the somewhat confusing and (in its way) exciting debate which has 
raged quietly in the pages of social psychology and personality 
psychology journals. Finally, Chapter Two will suggest the areas of 
stasis between dogmatism and social J.earning theories which will pro-
vide the setting for a test of both. 
Chapter Three will discuss rationale and design of an experi-
ment aimed at testing the competing paradigms. 
Chapters Four and Five will present results of the experiment 
and conclusions to be drawn from them. 
Throughout, it will be the purpose of the study to represent 
the arguments on both sides fairly, and to bring to the complexity 
of personality theory two contributions from speech communication: 
the one, an ordering and organization of the disorganized debate over 
social learning theory, and the other, a test of the two paradigms in 
a setting of communication behavior. 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE ON DOGMATISM AND 
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 
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This chapter provides a review of literature relative to the 
issue of psychodynamic trait theories of personality versus the more 
recent social learning view of persons and situations. Section I 
traces relevant literature on dogmatism theory as a carefully 
developed, validated, and researched example of trait psychology. 
Section II develops the social learning view and literature in 
' response to it. The chapter concludes with an examination of areas 
in which the two orientations speak directly to each other and make 
quite different and competing conclusions. 
I. LITERATURE ON DOGMATISM, WITH!:_ FOCUS ON LEARNING 
In order to design a behavioral test of trait theories and a 
competing paradigm of personality, this study will examine one 
specific trait theory, that of dogmatism. This trait is useful 
because it is typical of trait theories (it is believed to be part of 
the permanent structure of individuals' personalities and purports to 
predict consistent patterns of behavior across situations). As we 
shall se~, the dogmatism construct has been extensively validated, 
defended, and used in behavioral studies. Further, dogmatism'should 
be capable of providing a rigorous test of any challenge to the trait 
idea, since, as we shall see, it shares some similarities with intelli-
-gence which has proved less vulnerable to indictments brought by the 
challengers to trait theories. 
In order to provide an historical and scientific perspective 
for the concept of dogmatism, this section will trace the development 
of the authoritarianism concept, briefly summarize basic dogmatism 
theory ~s formulated by Rokeach and his associates, and trace in some 
detail the research which has followed the publishing of Rokeach's 
basic work and which applies to the study of learning. 
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We first shall review literature on dogmatism focusing on 
literature which applies to the area of learning. "Learning" has 
been defined by Kenneth E. Andersen as a process of acquisition or 
modification of beliefs, attitudes, and values, resulting from an 
organism's interaction with the environment (Andersen, 1972), 
Implicit in this definition is that l~arning will result in the 
acquisition and modification of corresponding types and patterns of 
behavior. Accordingly, the literature to be reviewed will refer 
variously to absorption of new information, persuasion, and changes 
in beliefs and values as part of that process of altering and modi-
fying the human organism which is called "learning," 
A. Antecedents to Dogmatism: The Authoritarian Personality 
The history of the concept of authoritarianism has been 
written by Nevitt Sanford (1965, pp. 25.5-319), Sanford credits Fromm 
for Fromm's work on masochism and sadism, but begins the narrative of 
the development of the authoritarianism concept with studies in anti-
Semitism, begun in 1943 by Sanford and Levinson at the University of 
California, Berkeley. This research culminated in the publication of 
The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, 1950), 
Among the hypothetical components of authoritarianism or facism 
which the researchers gleaned from interviews with anti-Semitic sub-
jects were "coh't__entionalism" (value placed on customary mores), 
"authoritarian submission," "authoritarian aggression," "superstition 
and stereotype," ''power and toughness" (preoccupation with a strength-
weakness dimension), and others (Sanford, 1965, pp. 269-275), 
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The Authoritarian Personalitl describes facism or authoritar-
ianism as a personality characteristic which causes susceptibility to 
"anti-democratic propaganda." Authoritarianism is seen as causally 
"behind" and contributing to certain behavior. It is viewed as both 
fixed and flexible; that is, it is an enduring feature of personality 
structure, but it represents one end of a continuum along which people 
may be seen as located relative to other people (Adorno, pp. 1-2, 5, ?), 
B. Rokeach's Dogmatism Theory 
The work of Milton Rokeach builds on and extends the idea of 
authoritarianism. Rokeach envisioned a study of authoritarianism not 
only of the right, but authoritarianism conceived as a part of one's 
personality structure, distinct from idealogical content, and thus dis-
coverable in persons of all ranges of politics or other ideology. 
Rokeach's theory received its fullest exposition in The~ 
and Closed Mind (1960). This book represents the most searching 
investigation of authoritarianism up to that time, and since its pub-
lication it has served as the foundation for most significant research 
in the area. Attempting much more than to refine earlier authoritarian 
personality theory, Rokeach has developed a personality model which, 
he argues, applies to and explicates a very wide range of human 
behavior. He begins with a discussion of "belief structures," 
1. Belief Structures. Rokeach envisions dogmatism and 
authoritarianism as a structural feature of personality. Rather than 
being limited to any one belief or set of beliefs within an individual, 
the extent to which one is open- or closed-minded affects all cognitive 
activity. 
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Specifically, the Rokeach model sees beliefs organized along a 
central-peripheral continuum (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 39 ff). Central 
beliefs are those basic, "primitive" beliefs about the nature of one's 
self and the world in which he lives. In the intermediate region are 
located beliefs about the nature of authority, and what people repre-
sent authoritative sources of information for him. The peripheral 
region encompasses beliefs and disbeliefs whose assimilation is the 
result of their coming from positive or negative authority figures in 
the intermediate region. 
Beliefs, according to Rokeach, are organized into "systems," 
a term which refers simply to groupings both of beliefs and disbeliefs. 
The belief system includes everything "that a person at a given time 
accepts as true of the world he lives in," and the disbelief system 
includes all that "a person at a given time rejects as false" 
(Rokeach, 1960, p. 33). The disbelief system is divided into dis-
belief subsystems which represent groupings of disbeliefs according 
to some relationship among the specific beliefs included (Rokeach, 
1960, p. 35). 
Rokeach takes pains to say that belief systems are not to be 
regarded only as religious or political or scientific systems, since 
any one belief could be said to fit all three of those categories and 
the human mind does not make such discreet divisions. But some 
division of disbelief subsystems according to interrelationships of 
beliefs has already been made explicit, and one sees Rokeach referring 
at least implicitly to belief subsystems as well. For example, when 
describing laboratory experiments, Rokeach describes subjects as facing 
the task of assimilating "a new belief system that is at odds with a 
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previously held belief system" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 286). Since a 
relatively small number of new beliefs is included in these studies, 
Rokeach appears to use the term ''belief system" to apply to almost 
any group of beliefs. 
This usage occurs again in a problem-solving experiment in 
which subjects are said to be integrating three new beliefs into "a 
new system" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 211). Even though belief systems are 
not only political, scientific, or religious, they evidently may be 
so. Rokeach at one point speaks of " •.. beliefs of a new system 
(political, religious, scientific, etc.) ••. " (Rokeach, 1960, p. 286). 
In short, a belief system for Rokeach may be any grouping of related 
beliefs, or may be the totality of what one accepts as true. 
2. Dogmatism and Resistance to Change. At this point the 
contrast between open-mindedness and closed-mindedness comes into 
focus. To the extent that one is open-minded, or low in dogmatism, he 
will assimilate new information "as is," according to its own merits. 
When new information is received by the open-minded person, the indi-
vidual beliefs in his belief system will be re-arranged and adjusted, 
as necessary, in keeping with the merits of the content and implica-
tions of the new information. To the extent that one is closed-
minded, on the other hand, new information will be assimilated only 
if it is seen as emanating from or consistent with an external posi-
tive authority source. It is accepted not on its own merits, but on 
its relationship to authority. The result may be that the new infor-
mation will be distorted to fit the existing belief system which 
already contains beliefs fed the individual by some accepted positive 
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authority source (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 50, 57 ff.). 
In terms of the central-peripheral continuum, the highly dog-
matic person is seen as follows: his central beliefs include a view 
of the world as threatening, his intermediate beliefs hold authority 
to be absolute (evaluating other people in terms of how they relate 
to that authority), and his peripheral beliefs (which come to him 
through his authorities) a.re isolated from each other, a feature of 
his belief system which allows conflicting beliefs to be held simul-
taneously (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 54 ff,). This closed-minded approach 
is seen as warding off threats to the individual's cognitive structure, 
providing him security in a seemingly unfriendly and threatening world. 
3. Dogmatism Susceptibilit~ to Change. One of the least 
understood and most overlooked areas of dogmatism theory has to do 
with susceptibility to change. Given new information which does not 
come from a highly authoritative source, the implication of the theory 
is that the high-dogmatic subject will be more resistant to attitude 
or belief change than the low-dogmatic individual. But basic dogmatism 
theory asserts that the closed-minded person should be highly suscep-
tible to change if the suggestion for change comes from a highly 
authoritative source. In such a situation the closed-minded person 
will be expected to change more, or more easily, than the open-minded 
subject (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 336-337), 
This view of the dogmatic person as susceptible to change 
stems from the fact that such a person,, relying heavily on authority, 
is a ''party-line" thinker in that he accepts uncritically beliefs 
suggested by highly authoritative sources (Rokeach, 1960, p. 49), 
This susceptibility to change is made possible in pa.rt by the 
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phenomenon of "isolation" of peripheral beliefs already mentioned 
above. Newly assimilated beliefs in the system of a closed-minded 
person a.re not related logically to other, already held, peripheral 
beliefs. Because they are accepted on the recommendation of positive 
authority figures, these beliefs are held uncritically, resulting in 
"the coexistence of logically contradictory beliefs within the 
belief system." This is made possible by the closed-minded person's 
"perception of irrelevance, " his tendency to avoid contradiction by 
refusing to recognize the logical relatedness of conflicting beliefs 
(Rokeach, 1960, pp. 36-37). 
C. Research in Dogmatism and Learning Since 1960 
A perusal of the published literature since 1960 reveals 
several hundred studies aimed directly at elaborating or testing 
dogmatism theory, and hundreds more which utilize or account for the 
concept in related experiments. There is no question that Rokeach's 
reconceptualization of authoritarianism has stimulated research 
interest. 
Not the least of this interest has been in the area of learn-, 
ing. To the extent that open- and closed-mindedness has to do with 
assimilation of new information, it is appropriate that learning be 
a prime area for testing and applying the theory. What follows is a 
summary and assessment of the literature on dogmatism and learning. 
1. Literature on Dogmatism and Resistance to Change. 
Rokeach's model of dogmatism anticipates that the highly dogmatic 
person will assimilate new information less efficiently than the non 
dogmatic person under some circumstances. Rokeach and his associates 
developed a problem-solving task, the rather famous "Doodlebug" 
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problem, which requires the subject to give up some prior beliefs and 
assimilate new ones in order to solve the problem. Low-dogmatic sub-
jects solved this problem faster than high-dogmatic subjects (Rokeach, 
1960, pp. 196 ff,). Rokeach axgues that two distinct processes are 
involved in the solution of the problem: "analysis," overcoming old 
beliefs which are recognized as inappropriate; and "synthesis," 
integrating the new beliefs (required for solution) into "a new 
belief system" (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 174-175). He offers evidence 
that open-minded and closed-minded subjects do not differ significantly 
in their analytic abilities, but do diff'er in their ability to synthe-
size the new information into a new belief system. 
Several studies have succeeded in showing an inverse correla-
tion between dogmatism and learning. White and Alter (1967, pp. 285-
289) reported testing 2,099 undergraduate psychology students over a 
two year period at the University of Utah, and found "statistically 
significant correlations between D scores and examination scores," 
but only from larger classes. However, the variability of correla-
tions, even among classes taught by the same teacher was so great 
that the authors suggested "the predictive power of the D Scale with 
regard to grades is not impressive" (White, 1967, p. 288). 
In 1968, Costin (pp • .529-534) again studied dogmatism and 
classroom achievement among psychology students. He hypothesized 
that dogmatism would not be related to students' assimilation of basic 
principles of psychology, but that dogmatism would correlate positively 
with students' "retention of specific false beliefs about human 
behavior" ( Costin, 1968, p. 529) . Costin reports both hypotheses 
confirmed. 
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The Ehrlich and Lee (1969, pp. 249-259) summary of research 
in dogmatism and learning reports some additional experiments in 
dogmatism and classroom achievement which, ta.ken together, show very 
mixed results. Among them is a study by Rokeach and Norrell (1966) 
which reports wide variation in the ability of the D Scale to predict 
academic achievement, depending on sex and academic major of subjects. 
Ehrlich and Lee interpret the findings to be highly suggestive of 
"the presence of uncontrolled intervening variables" (Ehrlich, 1969, 
p 251). 
Three studies which found a relatively uncomplicated inverse 
relationship between dogmatism and learning are notable primarily 
because their subjects were not college students. Linton (1968, 
pp. 49-53) correlated low dogmatism to achievement in grade school, 
\ 
Jacoby (1971, pp. J84-J88) found low-dogmatic subjects more willing 
to accept innovative products among several types of manufactured 
items, and Joure, et al (1972, pp. 151-156) reported greater change 
in self concept following sensitivity group training among low-
dogmatic subjects. 
The foregoing review suggests that a simple, unqualified 
relationship between dogmatism and resistance to change is supported 
neither by Rokeach nor by research in dogmatism since 1960. 
2. Literature .Q!! Dogmatism and Susceptibility to Change. 
The research described above was in some sense oriented toward the 
expectation that dogmatism is inversely related to change. But basic 
,dogmatism theory suggests a second, equally important area of investi-
gation; that is, the situation in which dogmatism and the likelihood 
or tendency to change are directly related. As we have seen, 
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according to Rokeach's theory, new information from a highly authori-
tative source should produce greatest change among highly dogmatic 
persons. 
To test this prediction, Rokeach and his associates redesigned 
the Doodlebug problem in such a way that the new beliefs required for 
solution did not have to be discovered by subjects, but were given 
to them "on a silver platter." In this experiment closed-minded 
subjects actually solved the problem faster than open-minded subjects 
(Rokeach, 1960, pp, 238-239). The time difference was not statisti-
cally significant but was found consistently in replications of the 
experiment using different beliefs and solutions. The explanation 
offered was that in this "silver platter mode" for presenting new 
information, closed-minded subjects do not have to remember the 
items since all three are presented at one time, thus their perform-
ances are enhanced. Open-minded subjects are less willing to accept 
new information unquestioningly, hence the "silver-platter mode" does 
not improve their performance (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 212-213), 
Incredibly, Rokeach's argument that closed-minded persons 
may be more subject to change or quicker to assimilate new informa-
tion is taken by some researchers as contrary to dogmatism theory! 
Ehrlich and Lee, for example, open their article by saying: "A 
central proposition of Rokeach's theory .• ,is that the cognitive 
system of closed persons is highly resistant to change" (Ehrlich, 
1969, p. 249). These same authors say later that the variable of 
authoritative message source is an "intervening variable" which may 
confound the experimental effects of dogmatism! (Ehrlich, 1969, 
p. 255), An experimental study in which the experimenter was 
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evidently surprised to find high-dogmatism correlated directly to 
persuasibility is that of Bostrom (1964, pp. 283-287). Bostrom 
examined students' rating of speakers and response to messages. He 
found that dogmatism was unrelated to ratings assigned to speakers, 
but that there was greater agreement with speakers' positions among 
dogmatic subjects. Bostrom did allude to the possibility that 
closed-minded subjects may be more persuasible, but concluded that 
such behavior was "illogical and inconsistent" (Bostrom, 1964, p, 287). 
No mention was made of whether the speakers in the study were per-
ceived generally as highly authoritative sources. 
On the other hand, several studies have recognized suscepti-
bility to change in dogmatic subjects as integral to Rokeach's model. 
Vidulich and Kaiman (1961, pp. 639-642) studied the conformity 
behavior of subjects who responded to light stimuli after an experi-
mental confederate (identified as high or low prestige source) had 
verbally expressed an opinion as to direction of movement of the 
light. The study found a significant correlation between high dogma-
tism, high prestige source, and conformity behavior. 
Mertz, Miller, and Balla.nee (1966, pp. 429-433, 485) subjected 
high- and low-dogmatic subjects to messages incongruous with their 
beliefs but attributed to highly authoritative sources. It was pre-
dicted that attitude change toward the sources would be greater among 
open-minded subjects (supported), but that attitude change toward the 
message concept would be greater among closed-minded subjects 
(supported to a limited degree). 
In 1968 Crano and Sigal (pp. 241-247) offered experimental 
evidence suggesting that highly dogmatic subjects assimilated 
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discrepant positions more readily than more open-minded subjects 
when the message source was presented as highly authoritative. They 
found slightly more change among low-dogmatic subjects in the direc-
tion advocated by a low prestige source. The authors interpret 
their findings in terms of dissonance theory, suggesting that high-
dogmatic persons have a low tolerance for dissonance or perceived 
inconsistency. 
Schmidt (1971, pp, 742-743) found a positive relationship 
between levels of dogmatism and suggestibility in experiments in 
which subjects were asked to perform visual, tactual, and word-
recognition tasks with a prestigious co-judge. High-dogmatic 
subjects were more influenced by prestigious co-judges than low 
dogmatics. 
It is also in this area of highly,authoritative sources that 
Rokeach's dogmatism theory has had one of its most serious challenges. 
Recall Rokeach's rationale for "party-line" thinking. Dogmatic sub-
jects, Rokeach asserts, are more susceptible to change when the new 
beliefs come from an authoritative source. His argument is that the 
experiment using the silver-platter mode of presentation is "analogous" 
to the presentation of new beliefs by a high authority figure. But he 
wants to say also that what the silver-platter experiment overcomes 
is the closed-minded person's tendency not to remember the new beliefs, 
Rokeach's use of memory in this explanation is speculative and 
significantly does not rule out the possibility that a dogmatic 
person's memory for new beliefs might be poor regardless of the 
prestige of the source. In other words, if memory is a variable in 
the persuasibility of dogmatic persons, it may be that what Rokeach's 
21 
silver-platter experiment showed was not that dogmatic subjects are 
highly susceptible to new beliefs from high prestige sources, but 
precisely that dogmatic subjects have poorer memories for new 
beliefs! It is this possibility that has subjected dogmatism theory 
to one of its directest and most serious challenges. Two studies have 
raised the issue of whether McGuire's (McGuire, 1968, pp. 1130-1187) 
view of persuasibility may not call into question any generalized 
trait of authoritarianism as a significant factor in persuasion. 
McGuire's position is that several processes act as variables in pro-
ducing general persuasibility, interacting to produce an outcome not 
necessarily explained by examining one process alone. He argues 
that at least two of these processes are at work in every persuasive 
situation: comprehension of the message (including attention and 
perception) and the willingness to yield to what is received. 
Johnson, Torcivia,, and Poprick (1968, pp 179-183), have 
suggested that McGuire's formulation conflicts with the idea that 
highly-authoritarian subjects are "source-oriented" or highly sus-
ceptible to change advocated by high-prestige message sources. They 
cite evidence that whereas authoritarianism (as measured by the F 
Scale) and yielding are related directly, authoritarianism and compre-
hension are inversely related. 
Accordingly, these investigators hypothesize that the point 
at which the comprehension and yielding components intersect to pro-
duce maximum persuasibility will be at a relatively low or moderate 
level of authoritarianism even when the message comes from a highly 
authoritative source. To test this hypothesis, they attributed 
messages opposed to frequent toothbrushing and x-ray detection of 
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Tuberculosis to both high and low credible sources. The results 
showed that the level of source credibility produced little differ-
ence in net persuasive effect on highly authoritarian subjects. As 
predicted, low F-scorers showed greatest differential response to 
messages from high versus low credible sources. 
The findings of Johnson, Torcivia, and Poprick were extended 
subsequently by Johnson and Izzett (1969, pp. 317-321). Noting that 
a difficult or ambiguous message may have masked the effect of 
authoritarian source-orientation, these authors compared four levels 
of authoritarianism (measured by the F Scale), high and low source 
credibility, and two levels of the yielding component indicated by 
plausible and implausible or unsupported messages. All messages were 
judged to be easily comprehensible. The results showed interaction 
between source credibility and authoritarianism to be that suggested 
by the McGuire mode'l. Low authoritarians responded more to highly 
credible sources than high authoritarians, just as in the previous 
study, 
Crary (1973) also addressed the question of whether yielding 
and comprehension could interact in such a way as to work against 
authoritarian/dogmatic reliance on authority. Noting that Johnson, 
Torcivia and Poprick (1968, pp. 179-183) did not actually isolate 
memory or comprehension as the variable which prevented high authori-
tarian subjects' yielding to persuasive appeals, he pointed out that 
an alternative explanation of those results ts that subjects were 
unwi_lling to comprehend. This would suggest that low comprehension 
operates as a strategy of refusing to yield; put another way, the 
Johnson, Torcivia, and Poprick results may have demonstrated only 
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that highly authoritarian/dogmatic subjects resist appeals even from 
high prestige sources. 
Crary (1973) then ran an experiment designed to demonstrate 
that higher levels of dogmatism correlated to lower comprehension 
independently of the yielding dimension. An informative message from 
a high credible source was presented wit~ no agreement or yielding 
re~uired of subjects. A measure of message comprehension found a 
significant inverse relationship between dogmatism and comprehension, 
suggesting that yielding and comprehension can operate at cross-
purposes to negate the predictions that highly dogmatic persons are 
easily swayed by high prestige sources. 
3. Summary of Literature Dogmatism and Learning. To sum-
marize this review of literature on dogmatism and learning, it is 
apparent that the notion that dogmatism is inversely related to 
learning or message acceptibility has received considerable support. 
The prediction of theory that dogmatism is positively related to 
learning or message acceptance has received little experimental 
support, and indeed has been seriously challenged. That aspect of ,,,. 
dogmatism theory which seems relatively intact is that dogmatism 
seems to be a powerful inverse predictor of the ability of subjects 
to remember new information. Remembering Rokeach' s claim that the 
dogmatism construct represents a structural, relatively stable, and 
situation-independent feature of personality, this review moves to an 
approach to personality which challenges these assumptions, one by one. 
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II. LITERATURE ON SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 
A. Walter Mischel' s "Reconceptualization of Personality" 
A central figure in recent investigations of personality and 
learning is Walter Mischel (1968) of Stanford University whose 
Personalitx and Assessment has sparked a great deal of subsequent 
debate. The book is significant in its review of several years of 
literature in the psychology of personality, proposed reformulation 
of the theoretical understanding of personality, and research guide-
lines, Our immediate concern is with the book's comments on research 
prior to 1968 in personality and learning. 
Mischel (1968, pp. 5-9) first notes that personality research 
has been dominated both by psychodynamic theory which holds that 
personality is formed genetically and during early childhood and, 
once formed, remains largely unchanging and unchanged throughout adult 
life; and by a trait orientation which shares with psychodynamic 
theory the premise that regularities in individual behavioral 
responses are signs of underlying structures or dispositions. These 
traits are discovered as abstractions from regularities in behavior, 
but they are seen both as reality and cause; the traits are believed 
both to exist and to function as causes of behavior. Trait psychology 
has engaged primarily in the quest for discovery and measurement of 
these underlying, structural predispositions of personality. 
1. Attack on Traits: Behavior is Not Consistent. Mischel's 
second chapter is a summary (Mischel, 1968, pp. 14-37) of the somewhat 
dismal success of that quest. Beginning with the most successful 
work, Mischel notes that "cognitive and intellectual" measures have 
had the best success in predicting behavior. Correlations between 
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intelligence and achievement, intelligence and grades, have been 
fairly high. Such tes'ts as Stanford-Binet, "Embedded Figures, 0 
"Tilting Room" and time-response tests have had a measure of success 
in predicting behavior. But even in this area of relative success, 
there are significant problems: low correlations are typical among 
two or more tests of the same subject's intellectual ability, 
reliability is limited to situations involving similar tasks, and 
results are highly vulnerable to procedural differences in test admini-
stration. 
These and other problems affect the whole trait approach to 
personality study, Mischel believes. F scale (authoritarianism) 
scores show no significant correlation with measures of rigidity 
(Mischel, 1968, pp. 28-JO). Researchers have failed to find correla-
tions among measures of dependency (Mischel, 1968, p. 27) and tests 
for susceptibility to conditioning (Mischel, 1968, p. J2). Mischel 
reports that measures of cognitive avoidance of threatening stimuli 
did intercorrelate with minimal statistical significance, but re-
searchers who reported the interrelationships of scores argued that 
the significance was insufficient to argue for a trait of cognitive 
avoidance. Moreover, subjects were found in at least one study to 
disagree on which stimuli were threatening (Mischel, 1968, pp. JO-J2). 
This review suggests to Mischel that it is in spite of 
research data that personality continues to be reconceptualized in 
terms of traits. He notes a study by Hartshorne and May (1930) of 
morality as a personality variable, in which researchers obtained 
very consistent and reliable pencil and paper responses from subjects 
but found relevant behavior to be very situation-specific and 
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unpredictable by test results, Mischel believes this early study 
foreshadows later personality research, and it certainly anticipates 
his own theoretical orientation that behavior is predictable by 
knowledge of situations to a far greater degree than by knowledge 
of personality variables. Mischel concludes that the psychodynamic, 
trait-oriented view has been so influential that data for cross-
situational specificity of behavior such as that reported by 
Hartshorne and May " ..• were reported extensively, but did not 
influence psychological theorizing about the generality of traits" 
(Mischel, 1968, p. 36). 
In Chapter IV of Personality and Assessment Mischel focuses 
particularly on the question of validity (Mischel, 1968, pp. 74-82) 
of personality questionnaires. Noting that the "least hazardous" 
data a.re obtained from tests which give examples of situations and 
ask for a response specific to the example, researchers have under-
utilized this approach in favor of ambiguous test items, artificial 
test situations, yes-no responses, and inferences subjects must 
make about themselves as traits. Thus the trait orientation not 
only influences the psychologist himself, but becomes a filter 
through which the subject must report on his own inner "states. " 
Further, the traits sought out have been developed arbitrarily, 
many individual questionnaire items duplicated, with the result 
' that " ••• one man's introversion scale could be another's measure of 
independence or resistance to conformity pressures" (Mischel, 1968, 
p. 75). 
Whereas Mischel reports over 100 studies correlating F Scale 
authoritarianism scores with variables such as ideology, anxiety, and 
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prejudice, he notes that (typical of pencil and paper trait question-
naires) F Scale results do not correlate significantly with non-
questionnaire personality measures of theoretically similar person-
ality variables (Mischel, 1968, pp. 77-78), Citing an extensive 
review of research on personality and performance in a small group 
from 1900 to 1957, the median correlation in no study was reported 
by the reviewer to exceed .25 and more typically ranged near .15. 
But in some later studies, including some conducted by Mischel him-
self, where statistically significant correlations were found between 
personality trait measures and behavior, the magnitude of the rela-
tionship was so small as to account for only a fraction of the 
variance noted (Mischel, 1968, pp. 78-82). 
Mischel then cautions about interpreting data from personality 
measures (Mischel, 1968, pp. 83 ff.), noting that experimenter predis-
position, and agree-disagree tendencies of subjects rnay account for 
much of the magnitude of responses and correlations obtained. More-
over, Mischel notes, the similarity of individual items makes this 
cross-correlational "validation" very suspicious. Or, put another way, 
when individual test items a.re the same or similar, highly correlated 
responses may be attributed to highly similar situational factors in 
administering the tests. A further caveat to the interpretation of 
test data comes from Mischel's report that respons~s to trait 
questionnaires frequently covary with intelligence scores as 
significantly as with alternative measures of the trait, suggesting 
that the trait should not be regarded as an independent construct 
of personality. 
Finally, Mischel (1968, pp. 91-99) argues the fallacy of 
reasoning directly from construct validity to systematic validity 
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on personality tests. He notes that defining a construct in terms 
of a series of test items, and then reasoning from responses on 
those items to a conclusion that the subject possesses or does not 
possess that trait is a process which assumes a causal link which 
is unproved. He argues that so long as construct validity is the 
only validity demonstrated with the accompanying argument that 
behavioral referents for a trait a.re not available, the trait con-
struct is "unstudiable." Throughout Mischel's early chapters he 
repeats a claim which especially applies to an over-reliance on 
construct validity in defending psychological traits: the ascription 
of traits to subjects by researchers probably gives more information 
about the psychological make-up of the researchers than that of the 
subjects. In a later chapter which focuses on changing behavior in 
psychologically troubled and maladapted patients or clients, this 
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point is repeated (Mischel, 1968, p. 198) in reference to supposed 
"mental illness." Such "illnesses" or "diseases," he argues, just 
like supposed traits have no validity beyond construct validity. 
Hence the loci of mental diseases and traits are in the observer. 
We shall come to see that the significance of this for Mischel is no 
less than to suggest an alternative approach to prediction and control 
of behavior. 
I 
2, Alternative to Traits: Social Behavior/Social Learning 
Theory. After developing extensively the foregoing argument that 
psychodynamic psychology has failed to demonstrate that (a) behavior 
is caused by broad, underlying predispositions or traits and (b) 
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trait tests (personality inventories) are valid beyond construct 
validity, and having argued that the locus of such traits is the 
observer, rather than the observed, Mischel suggests an alternate 
view of behavior which focuses on the behavior itself rather than 
on antecedent causes. The discussion is not limited to the modifi-
cation of behavior; it begins by developing the view that social 
behavior is learned. The basic theory is variously called ''social 
learning theory" (Mischel, 1968, pp. 149-150) and "social behavior 
theory."* It does not presume the existence of traits, and thus 
does not rely on the demonstrating of cross-situational consistency 
of behavior. Instead, the theory is concerned with variations in 
situations, independent stimulus variables which "covary with the 
occurrence, maintenance, and change of the behavior" (Mischel, 1968, 
p. 150). The theory suggests three sources of learned behavior. 
The first source of learned social behavior is "observational 
learning," (Mischel, 1968, p. 150-157) which is learning which 
results from noting the behavior of others. It is learning which 
is not directly :reinforced, but relies on observation of behavior and 
the conditions in the environment which constitute the situation or 
*The significance of this seems to be that Mischel will argue 
that behaviors do not occur because they were caused by some under-
lying predisposition; rather, they are evoked by stimulus conditions 
which interact with a person's repertoire of behaviors, his percep-
tions and constructions of the evoking situation, and such cognitive 
activities as placing value on stimuli and behavior outcomes. All 
of these things about a person have been learned and Mischel takes 
social learning theory as his model for how behaviors are acquired 
and subsequently evoked. Thus the understanding of behavior accord-
ing to the social learning model becomes "social behavior theory" 
which we shall observe evolving in Mischel's later writings into 
"cognitive social learning theory," 
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setting of the behavior, and then "matching" the modeled behavior. 
This kind of learning is a complex process involving perceived 
characteristics of the mod.el whose behavior is observed, the observer's 
prior conditioning, and the observer's experiences of reinforcement 
for "matching" or independent behavior. 
Secondly, conditioning (Mischel, 1968, pp 157-158) is 
suggested as a source of learned social behavior. This kind of 
learning is characterized by various stimuli "acquiring valence and 
reinforcing powers when they become associated with other stimuli 
that already have reinforcing powers and emotion-arousing properties" 
(Mischel, 1968, p. 157). Such conditioning may be aversive or posi-
tive, and Mischel notes that this kind of behavioral learning may be 
the primary source of highly emotional valences of stimuli. Condition-
ing in which the positive or aversive stimulation is not received 
directly but is observed, Mischel calls "vicarious classical condi-
tioning" (Mischell, 1968, p. 158). A distinction is made between 
behavior which is learned (that is, included in the repertoire of 
behaviors a person can perform) and performance of the behavior 
(since situational constraints or lack of incentive may work against 
the performance of a learned behavior). 
A third source of socially learned behavior is that of 
"response-reinforcement relations" (Mischel, 1968, pp, 161-167), 
This kind of learning produces patterns of responses based on rein-
forcement of past responses. Mischel discusses briefly several 
variables in reinforcing responses, including seq_uencing and sched-
uling of reinforcement and the effects on responses that these cause, 
Most significantly for the research and therapy paradigm which Mischel 
will later develop he reviews several studies to demonstrate that: 
"The response pattern selected by an indi-
vidual in a situation is affected by the 
previous reinforcing consequences or rein-
forcement history of similar responses in 
earlier related situations ••. " (Mischel, 
1968, p. 164). 
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It is further noted that the process of response reinf'orcement may 
be affected. by providing information regarding the situation or 
behavioral outcomes, persuasive appeals, high or low credibility 
of a communication, needs for consistency, etc. (Mischel, 1968, 
pp. 169-171). These variables which are or may be introduced ver-
bally may be a primary cause of any experimental results and must 
be considered part of the real contingencies of any situation 
(experimental or otherwise) which produce behavior. As Mischel 
argues, these contingencies are of primary concern in predicting 
whether a person will behave one way or another ..• response-
reinf'orcement is perceived by persons in terms of the situations in 
which the reinforcement occurs. 
This suggests to Mischel that the earlier experimental results 
showing very inconsistent behaviors across situations support social 
learning theory or social behavior theory as delineated here. If 
subjects could not distinguish among varying situational constraints, 
their "consistent" behavior in different situations would be appro-
priate for some, but very inappropriate for others. Clearly, people 
do discriminate among situations. 
Accordingly, Mischel believes: 
"it is naive to believe that behavior on 
psychological tests ostensibly measuring 
personality reflects a pure x-ray-like 
version of the respondent's durable under-
lying psyche and is somehow immune to 
response reinforcement consequences and 
situational cues" (Mischel, 1968, pp. 184-
185) I 
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Where cross situational consistency does occur, as in achievement or 
intelligence tests, it is likely that this is due to the similarity 
of consequences for certain responses across many situations, and 
the similarity of response modes. Where social desirability of 
responses varies from situation to situation the responses will vary 
accordingly. Social learning theory suggests an approach to control 
of behavior which involves identifying those situational stimuli 
which have significance for the person, then systematically manipu-
lating a few of the most important ones to produce the behavioral 
change (Mischel, 1968, pp. 182-191). 
This implication relates directly to Mischel's earlier point 
that overreliance on construct validity by trait theorists tells one 
more about the inner states of the observer than about subject traits 
or personality variables. In his chapter on psychotherapeutic 
behavior change, he notes (Mischel, 1968, pp. 198-201) that just as 
trait psychologists have attributed broad behavioral causality to 
' traits, psychoanalysts have attributed problematic behavior to 
mental illness or disease. He believes that such attribution of 
causes of behavior is no more valid or demonstrable than that 
practiced by trait psychologists. Ascribing traits or inner states 
to others, Mischel argues, is really a process of making a "social 
judgment" about the social appropriateness of behavior, or about the 
behavioral consequences for the person. Social learning theory or 
social behavior theory would shift this focus away from "causes" of 
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maladaptive behavior, to specific changes in behavior brought about 
by appropriate and systematic manipulation of' situations. 
"Rather than becoming embroiled in social 
judgments about the client's behaviors, or 
in speculative reconstructions about their 
hypothetical origins and motivational roots, 
behavior assessment begins with an attempt 
to select reasonable treatment objectives" 
(Mischel, 1968, p. 198). 
"Research, assessment, and treatment are 
truly integrated in the social behavior 
approach. Assessment identif'ies the problem-
producing stimuli; treatment modif'ies the 
disadvantageous responses .•• by changing the 
power of the problematic stimuli, either by 
associating them with other stimuli or by 
changing the conse~uences they evoke. 
Alterations in previously problematic behavior 
are also supplemented by the development of' 
more advantageous alternative behaviors. " 
(Mischel, 1968, p. 201). 
B. Elaboration of' the Social Learning Model 
In 1973 Mischel (197Jc, pp, 2,52-283) expanded on the position 
presented above. Beginning with a recapitulation of' research f'ind-
ings on personality traits, Mischel noted that significant correla-
tions are to be f'ound between intelligence tests and such behavior 
as problem-solving, and that people rate themselves in trait terms 
very consistently across various self'-report measures. But beyond 
that, the data indicate high situational specif'icity of' behavior and 
little utility of' "inf'erring global personality dispositions f'rom 
behavioral signs •.• " (Mischel, 1973c, p. 253). 
The article then responded to critics of' social behavior 
theory and made suggestions as to how variations in situations may 
be manipulated experimentally. We shall examine that part of' 
Mischel's 1973 paper which elaborates on his social behavior/learning 
theory we have examined thus far. 
1. The Social !earning View of Persons. Mischel proposes an 
alternatiye to the psychodynamic theoretical orientation whose empiri-
cal support and utility he has attacked. In its place he suggests a 
set of "person variables" which in a sense define personality, not in 
terms of what a person has, but in terms of what he does in construct-
ing and responding to the situations which "evoke, maintain, and 
modify them" (Mischel, 197Jc, p. 265). These person variables are 
suggested as representing "a synthesis of promising constructs in the 
areas of cognition and social learning" (Mischel, 197Jc, p. 265). 
Thus, they are something of a beginning, an attempt to conceptualize 
personality in a way consistent with the foregoing comments on person-
ality research. In the attempt to categorize how persons mediate 
stimuli in their individually unique and idiosyncratic construction 
of situations, Mischel believes that the variables overla~ while re-
maining distinct enough to be measured and systematically manipulated. 
a. "Cognitive and Behavioral Construction Capacities" 
(Mischel, 197Jc, pp. 265-267), This first person variable is a broad 
category which includes the choice of constructs the person applies 
to himself and others, accepted social norms, and how information is 
acquired or ''retrieved," categorized, and transformed. Here the focus 
is on what a person does in responding to stimuli and what he is 
capable of doing (what repertoire of possible behaviors is at his 
disposal). Although all person variables proposed here are situa-
tionally fluid, this one dealing largely with intellectual capacities 
is relatively enduring, 
35 
b. "Encoding Strategies and Personal Constructs" 
(Mischel, 1973c, pp. 267-269). This variable deals with the meaning 
of situational stimuli as transformed through perceptual selectivity 
(attention and filtering) and encoded into meaningf'ul symbolic 
representations. One~s view of self is based on information which 
is also transformed by perception, and encoding processes, and the 
tendency to perceive self in stable trait terms is explained by con-
structing various behaviors in different situations as (subjectively) 
consistent. 
c. ''Behavior-Outcomes and Stimulus Outcome Expectancies" 
(Mischel, 1973c, pp. 269-272), Expected consequences of behavior, 
perceived sign-relationships among stimuli, and intentions of others 
are all included in this category. Such expectancies clearly mediate 
the way persons respond to situations. Or as Mischel puts it, these 
expectancies mediate the degree to which behavior is cross-
situationally consistent. If expectancies are not similar in differ-
ent situations, then behaviors should not be expected to covary. The 
best source of ipf'ormation on such expectancies must be the subject 
himself, reporting on his expectancies in a given situation. 
d. "Subjective Stimulus Values" (Mischel, 1973c, pp. 
272-273). Even if two subjects' expectancies are the same, the value 
they place on expected outcomes may vary. Thus one person may behave 
differently from another with whom he shares similar expectancies 
because he values different behavioral consequences. 
e. "Self Regqlatorl Systems and Plans" (Mischel, 1973c, 
pp. 273-275). Persons set goals for themselves, interpret whether 
they have been reached, and engage in continuuing self-critical 
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assessment in the achieving of the goals. Mischel sees this as a 
person constructing his own outcomes, his own behavioral consequences. 
2. The Social Learning View of Situations. Mischel argues 
further that behavior may be predicted without knowledge of person 
variables, but based on knowledge of "relevant stimulus conditions, 
especially when those conditions are powerful" (Mischel, 1973c, p. 
277). As examples of this, he notes studies which establish that 
post-hospital prognosis of mental patients is predicted best by 
knowledge of whether the patient was institutionalized or in the 
community, and whether jobs and "family support" were provided, that 
"predictions of intellectual achievement are greatly improved if they 
take account of the degree to which the child's environment supports 
(models and reinforces) intellectual development" (Mischel, 1973c, 
P. 277), 
Four criteria are offered (Mischel, 1973c, p. 276) as indices 
of whether a situation is "powerful" or "highly constrained." 
a. The situation induces all persons to construe or 
interpret it the same ( to the extent the situation is "uniformly 
encoded") . 
b. The situation induces uniform expectancies regarding 
the appropriate behavior (this would appear to include expectancies 
regarding behavioral outcomes). 
c, The situation provides adequate incentives or reward 
for the appropriate behavior, 
d. The situation instills the skills necessary for under-
standing and executing the appropriate behavior. 
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J. The Social Learning View of Persons and Situations 
Interacting. Having suggested a tentative paradigm for an under-
standing of persons and situations, Mischel suggests that person 
variables interact with situations in producing behavior; and he 
sets about describing the interaction (Mischel, 1973c pp. 276-279). 
Situations affect behavior by "influencing" person variables such 
as encoding, expectancies, and so forth. If the situation is 
"ambiguously structured," (Mischel, 1973c, P~ 276) he believes, 
the person variables are most likely to predict behavior. 
"To the degree that a situation is 
'unstructured,' the subject will expect 
that any response from him is likely to 
be equally appropriate (i.e., will lead 
to similar consequences) and variance 
from individual differences will be 
greatest. Conversely, when subjects 
expect that only one response will be 
reinforced (e.g., only one "right" 
answer on an achievement test, only one 
correct response for the driver when the 
traffic light turns red) and that no 
other responses are equally good, and 
all subjects are motivated and capable 
of making the appropriate response, 
then individual differences will be 
minimal and situational effects pre-
potent. To the degree that subjects 
are exposed to powerful treatments, the 
role of individual differences will be 
minimized. Conversely, when treatments 
are weak, ambiguous, or trivial, indi-
vidual differences in person variables 
should exert significant effects." 
(Mischel, 1973c, p. 276). 
Mischel explains the interaction between situation and 
personality another way, using terms specifically related to the 
"person variables. " 
"Psychological'1 situations and 12treatments" 
are powerful to the degree that they lead 
all persons to construe the particular events 
the same way, induce uniform expectancies 
regarding the most appropriate response 
pattern, provide adequate incentives for 
the performance of that response pattern, 
and instill the skills necessary for its 
satisfactory construction and execution, 
Conversely, situations and treatments a.re 
weak to the degree that they are not uni-
formly encoded, do not generate uniform 
expectancies concerning the desired 
behavior, do not offer sufficient tncen-
tives for its performance, or fail to pro-
vide the learning conditions required for 
successful construction of the behavior." 
(Mischel, 197Jc, p. 276). 
The point seems to be that it is not only true that situa-
tions control behavior, it is equally true that persons construe 
situations, even the same situation, very differently (Mischel, 
1973c, pp. 278-279), Further, persons alter ·situations by con-
struing them and behaving in response to mediated situational 
stimuli, One's behavior in a given situation, for example, influ-
ences how other persons in that situation will behave, Thus 
"situation" is not static, but fluid, and relates to behavior in 
a highly interactive and mutually dependent manner, 
Although the emphasis in the foregoing sections seems to 
shift back and forth between the researcher's knowledge of the 
''powerfulness" of a situation to the construction (interpretation) 
of a situation by the subject, both ideas are clearly articulated 
in the 1973c article, I will comment at more length on this 
apparent problem when discussing criticisms of the social learning 
paradigm of personality. 
C, Social Learning Research 
1. Research SupPorting the Person X Situation Interaction 
View, Several studies are cited in support of the view of person/ 
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situation interaction which we shall review here. 
Mischel and Staub (1965, pp. 172-179) studied the effects of 
choice contingencies on subjects with high and low generalized 
expectancies of success in task performance. Subjects were given 
a problem or task to solve and were then told they had failed or 
succeeded, or were given no information. They were then asked to 
choose between an immediate reward of lesser value or a delayed 
reward of greater value. Obtaining the greater reward was contin-
gent on successful completion of a second, similar task plus delay, 
completion of a dissimilar task plus delay, or delay only with no 
task. Among the findings: 
a. High expectancy subjects with no information on the 
initial task chose task contingent rBwards significantly more often 
than low expectancy's (i.e., the person variable of expectancy pre-
dicted choices when information about the situation was lacking) 
b. Both high and low expectancy subjects were more 
likely to choose task contingent rewards after information was pro-
vided that the initial task was completed successfully, than when 
they were led to believe they had failed (here the situational 
element of information of success or failure predicts outcome), 
c. larger (delayed) rewards with no task contingencies 
were preferred more often in all groups of subjects than delayed 
rewards contingent on task completion. (Prediction of this outcome 
would require knowledge of the multiple situational variables of 
reward size and task contingency.) 
In 1973 Mischel commented on this study: 
"The effects of situational success and 
failure were so strong that they wiped out 
the role of individual differences in pre-
experimental expectancy for success. But 
in the 'no information' condition (in 
which subjects obtained no feedback about 
their performance quality in the situation) 
pre-experimental expectancy was a highly 
significant determinant of their choice to 
work for contingent rewards." (Mischel, 
1973c, pp. 276-277). 
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In another series of studies on delay of gratification, 
Mischel, Ebbeson, and Zeiss (1972, pp. 129-142) studied the ability 
of children to wait for a more attractive delayed reward. This 
experiment found that children who were able to see both the 
lesser (immediate) and greater (delayed) or who were instructed 
to ideate about the rewards were more likely to seek immediate 
gratification. But in a variation on this study, Mischel and Moore 
(1973, pp. 172-179) found to their surprise that subjects who were 
presented with a picture of the rewards were able to delay gratifi-
cation significantly longer than those for whom no such symbolic 
representation was present. Thus on the one hand the presence of a 
reward or thinking about it worked against delay of gratification; 
on the other hand a picture of the reward seems to have enhanced 
delay. This seemingly subtle difference in situational stimuli pro-
duced marked differences in behavior. 
Mischel, Ebbesen and Zeiss (1973, pp. 129-142) studied the 
effect of subjects' success or failure on an achievement and expect-
ancy of further testing on attention to positive and negative infor-
mation about themselves. Subjects were given the Byrne Sensitization-
Repression Scale prior to the experiment. As predicted, "sensitizers" 
who expected no further testing were more likely to attend to negative 
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information about themselves and conversely. But this effect was 
eliminated in the situational variable of expectancy of testing. 
There was no significant difference in preference for positive and 
negative feedback among "sensitizers" and "repressors" when subjects 
expected further tests to be run on themselves. Although no signi-
ficant interaction was obtained between expectancy and the effect 
of sensitization-repression on attention to negative feedback, the 
expectancy variable did "modify" that interaction enough that differ-
ences between "sensitizers" and "repressors" regarding attention to 
negative feedback were insignificant. 
Moos (1968, p. 49-61) argued that there is reason to believe 
that interactions between subjects' individual differences and situa-
tion, subjects and modes of behavior, and situation and modes of 
behavior better predict behavior than individual differences or 
situations alone. Referring to a study by Endler, Hunt, and 
Rosenstein (1962, pp. 1-33) which obtained reports from subjects 
about responses presumed to be indicative of anxiety experienced in 
a variety of a~)-ety-producing settings, Moos noted that these 
researchers found that individual differences and settings, each 
accounted for 5-10% of the variance noted, whereas the interactions 
among variables accounted for considerably more variance, with J0-35% 
of variance estimated to be accounted for by a second-order interac-
tion among individuals, settings, and modes of behavior. 
Moos (1969, pp. 40,5-412) attempted to study these inter-
actions more systematically and reliably by eliciting reports from 
outpatients and staff members at a psychiatric hospital about their 
feelings in various everyday settings, including going to bed, at 
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lunch, in group therapy, et-0. Subjects :responded to a semantic 
differential questionnaire while in these situations on items includ-
ing hostility, security, shyness, socialibility, and several others. 
Moos found that individual d.if'ferences and setting differences each 
accounted for significant amounts of variance. Individual X setting 
interactions accounted for more variance than individual differences 
or settings alone. Consistent with Mischel's argument, Moos noted 
that individual differences among patients accounted for significantly 
more variance than amo~g staff members (Mischel argues that cross-
situational consistency is dysfunctional and abnormal) and that 
knowledge of either individuals or situations is insufficient to pre-
dict behavior. Moos summarizes succinctly: 
".,.the setting is important not necessarily 
because it elicits the same reactions across 
all patients, but rather because it elicits 
different reactions in different patients, 
different reactions which cannot be accurately 
predicted from knowing only the general 
response tendencies of the patient." (Moos, 
1968, pp. 57-.58). 
The above studies suggest that in the absence of situational 
variables impinging on a subject's behavior, person variables may 
indeed predict behavior. But when subjects are aware of situational 
variables such as the presence or absence of task contingencies, 
past success or failure on similar tasks, and likelihood of future 
testing, the effect of person variables is overwhelmed by these 
situational factors, and situations appear to predict and control 
behavior. 
2, Future Research Implications. Eischel portrays social 
behavior theory as enlisting the aid of the client (Mischel, 1968, 
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pp .. 2J6 ff. ) or subject in seeking specific behavioral referents for 
the vague linguistic terms in which clients express their problems. 
These referents must be ""public" _as opposed to private, specific as 
opposed to general, behavioral as opposed to trait-oriented, in order 
for specific behavioral objectives to be achieved by manipulating the 
stimuli which a.re problematic for the disturbed person. He recommends 
Kelly's methodology for eliciting from subjects specific information 
about their problems and conditions which make them ''better" or 
''worse." Besides this interview technique, other self-report mecha-
nisms a.re suggested including subject diaries, lists of all stimuli 
which cause discomf'ort, and pre-prepared anxiety scales for clients 
to make. In addition to self reports, Mischel recommends direct 
sampling of behavior with closeness of approach to aversive stimuli 
serving as the objective measure. 
Strength of reinforcement value (Mischel, 1968, pp. 251 ff.) 
utilizes client assistance throug? reports of preference or rank 
ordering types of reinforcement. Another technique is that of 
observing a client "selecting" reinforcement by systematically 
administering various reinforcing stimuli as the client selects 
from among several task options. Mischel notes the danger of assum-
ing that certain reinforcement stimuli (particularly social rewards) 
have positive value for a given client. 
Lea.ming problems a.re also addressed by the social behavior 
approach (Mischel, 1968, pp. 2.54 ff). Beginning from a "baseline" 
level for each subject, desirable reinforcements are introduced for 
progress in small enough increments that no massive failures occur. 
Specific behavioral goals a.re charted for each subject with appropriate 
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reinforcing stimuli, again selected for each subject. Moreover, the 
program is constantly reviewed. for possible revision of learning 
increments and reinforcement. 
Here, then, is a listing of several points from Personality 
and Assessment (Mischel, 1968) and the 1973 article (Mischel, 197Jc) 
which Mischel offers as criteria for research. 
a. Researchers and therapists must specify behavioral 
referents; public (not private), specific (not general), behavioral 
(not trait-oriented). 
\ b. Along with behavioral specificity, there must be 
specificity of conditions in which the behavior occurs. Predictive 
hypotheses must therefore specify (1) behavioral mode and (2) situa-
tional contingencies in which the behavior is expected to be high or 
I low frequency. 
"Such cumbersome, hyphenated descriptions 
would lack the 'thumbnail sketch' appeal of 
global trait portraits. But they would 
remind us of the discriminativeness and 
complexity of the individual's behavior, 
it's idiosyncratic organization, its 
dependence on conditions, and the hazards 
of attempting to abbreviate it grossly." 
(Mischel, 1973c, p. 278). 
c. Researchers should enlist subjects in telling the 
researcher (therapist) which stimuli a.re positively or negatively 
significant to them (which may work at cross-purposes to concealed 
experimenter purpose), using: 
(1) Kelley's categories technique 
(2) Interviews 
(J) Diaries 
(4) Subject-made lists 
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(5) Pre-prepared check lists 
(6) Direct behavioral sampling: manipulate (for 
example) some anxiety a.rousing pictures, objects, 
etcetera, and observe effect. 
d. Subjects should be enlisted in determining "behavior 
outcome expectancies:" ("if I do such and such, such and such will 
occur"). Mischel also notes that expectancies can be altered by 
giving instructions about the required response and reinforcement 
available (Mischel, 1973c, p. 270). 
e. Subjects should describe their own self-regulatory 
rules and plans which tend to guide the individual and impose consis-
tency on him in the absence of powerful situations (Mischel, 1973c, 
p. 279). 
f. Rewards or reinforcement values must be elicited by 
subject rank-order (Mischel, 1973c, p. 273); i.e. social rewards may 
not have the value for a subject/client that experimenter/therapist 
presumes, by allowing choices from among several possibilities, or 
rank-ordering reward possibilities. 
g. Conceptualization of behavior must be embeddBd in 
specific conditions in which it occurs. Pr-edictions should be made 
in terms of behavior-contingency units which specify modes and con-
ditions in which a given behavior will be of high- or low- frequency 
(Mischel, 197Jc, p, 278). 
In summary, it would appear that Mischel is suggesting that 
everything about the subject which is relevant should be known. The 
acquisition of that knowledge by a researcher should be guided by the 
"person variables~• as categories of information about a person in 
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interaction with a highly specific (and idiosyncratically construed) 
situation.. Perhaps another way of saying this is that everything 
about the situation must be known by the researcher, but the acqui-
sition of that knowledge must cbme from the subject himself. I shall 
argue below "i.n evaluating social learning/behavior theory that the 
two statements in Mischel's paradigm are equivalent. 
n.- Rejoinder to the Social/Learning Model: Traits Defended 
In a later section we shall examine critics' responses and 
objections to the social learning model. First I however I this section 
will summarize those responses whose £ocus is that of defending the 
trait conceptualization itself. 
1. Theoretical Defense of Traits. One area of attack the 
social learning paradigm has developed concerns potential usefulness 
and theoretical justification for identifying personality disposi-, 
tions. In 1971 Jones and Nisbett developed an argument based on the 
history of the concept of qualities or attributes as developed in 
the history of science {Jones and Nisbett, 1971, p. 86). Noting the 
distinction among primary qualities {objective features existing 
apart from anyone's perceptions of them), secondary qualities (such 
as taste I odor I or color, which exist only as sensed by an organism), 
and value qualities (such as beauty or goodness, which exist only in 
the perceiver), these authors argue that the attribution of traits to 
subjects represents confusion between primary and value qualities. 
Jones and Nisbett believe that to ascribe a trait to a person is 
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really to make an evaluative judgment about him (recall Mischel's 
belief that trait attributions are a "social judgment" ma.de on 
behavior), while mistakenly thinking the trait to be a primary 
quality npossessed,. by the person judged. 
In response to Jones and Nisbett, James R. Averill (1973, 
pp. 275-283) notes that the distinction among primary, secondary, 
and value qualities has never been clear or agreed on by philoso-
phers . He notes the range of views on this :from Pl.a tonism ( which 
views all qualities as primary) to the Idealism summarized in 
Berkeley's~ est percipi (all qualities lie in the perceptions 
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o:f the obsBrver). Moreover, the distinction has had the troublesome 
e:f:fect of limiting research both in the sciences and in psychology. 
But a second line of attack on trait dispositions has come from the 
Aristotelian distinction among types of causes. The tradition of 
British Empiricism and logical positivism has accepted only efficient 
cause (which must be an event) as appropriate for scientific inquiry. 
The result has been, Averill believes, that traits have been reinter-
preted as inner stimuli (a move which makes the logical mistake of 
shifting logical categories by interpretation of a concept) or else 
traits have been denied any explanatory power (because dispositions 
as formal causes:::!'-may have no explanatory power in a mechanistically 
oriented science). As an alternative, Averille advances the view that 
(1) dispositions or traits do not refer to events, but summarize the 
relationships among events (dispositions are "high-order relational 
variables") (Averille, 1973, p. 281); (2) beyond mere historical 
precedBnt there is no compelling philosophical or logical basis for 
denying that dispositional qualities are a function both of that 
which is observed and the observer, and (3) dispositions can :function 
to explain events. This author also responds to the Jones and Nisbett 
argument that ascribing traits to others, but not to one's sel:f, 
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indicates an entirely different mode of information processing, 
Averill counters that dispositions may reflect only the difference 
in knowledge one has of the other compared to self-knowledge, and 
are therefore useful as answers to the sorts of questions one would 
ask about another's behavior. Rather than throwing out all dispo-
sitional traits on~ priori grounds which are not compelling, they 
should be recognized as potentially useful "under appropriate circum-
stances." The elucidation of these appropriate circumstances is an 
important problem for future empirical research" (Averill, 1973, 
p. 282). 
In one respect, Averill's position is consistent with 
Mischel. As we have seen, Mischel believes that the attribution of 
traits to others is an important area of study, and that it may in 
fact be possible to identify genuine dispositions in persons. It is 
true that Mischel avoids the cross-situational consistency assumption 
of the term "trait*' and uses "person variable" to indicate disposi-
tions which predict behavior when situations are ambiguous, but his 
belief t~at person variables interact with situations seems very com-
patible with Averill. In another respect, however, the Averill paper 
skirts the main issue that Mischel has developed earlier. The primary 
burden Mischel lays on psychodynamic theorists is precisely to demon-
strate the utility of broad dispositional traits. Averill says only 
that there is no theoretical reason to deny such utility. Thus, in 
a sense the two positions agree that identification of dispositional 
traits may be of some value, but Mischel wants to know what that 
value is and the Averill paper does not provide an answer. 
2. Utility of Traits. One of the most vigorous attacks on 
Mischel's paradigm has come from Paul L. Wachtel (197Ja, pp. 324-
334) who sees the controversy in terms of conflicting approaches to 
psychotherapy. Arguing that (1) psychodynamic theorists and thera-
pists have long recognized situational specificity in behavior, he 
cites several writers on psychoanalysis who have dealt with selective 
perception, the influence of external stimuli, and the role of analyst 
as a participant in the psychoanalytic setting. Moreover, (2) psycho-
dynamic theories were originally intended for abnormal persons whose 
inability to adapt to situations is demonstrable, whereas the re-
search cited by Mischel deals with normal subject populations. Fur-
ther, (3) the laboratory with its narrowing of the field of environ-
mental stimuli may create unrealistic response inconsistencies which 
would be more consistent and predictable in realistic interpersonal 
situations where the subject is more free to focus on stimuli he 
chooses; behaviorist therapy then, perpetuates this experimental bias 
and manipulates only stimuli. 
To the first argument, Mischel (197Ja, pp 335-344) responds 
that no one is denying psychodynamic theorists' concern with situa-
tional specificity. For Wachtel to "answer" such a misinterpretation 
is to focus on a pseudo-issue. Rather, the issue is whether from 
diverse behaviors interpreted as "signs" these theorists are justified 
in reasoning backwards and very indirectly to underlying "genotypic" 
dispositions, and most important, what utility has been empirically 
demonstrated of this quest. Following this point and in response to 
Wachtel's second attack, Mischel points to his chapter (Mischel, 1968) 
on the utility of psychodynamic approaches, noting that studies have 
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not supported the therapeutic utility of the approach. In response 
to Wachtel's third major point, Mischel notes that he has argued 
for an exploration of each subject's idiosyncratic constructions of 
situations both in the laboratory and in therapy, so that situational 
stimuli and therapeutic stimuli may be tailored for each subject's 
idiographic qualities. This suggests a very different view of 
behaviorist therapy (and research) than the mechanistic, personality-
less, and stimulus oriented picture suggested by Wachtel. Mischel 
further notes that his own focus on situations may be easily misinter-
preted if one fails to note his emphasis on situation as construed 
and selected by the subject or client himself. But given that 
emphasis Mischel is not vulnerable to Wachtel's attack. 
The discussion between Wachtel and Mischel is not quite com-
plete, however, for each was given a rebuttal opportunity in the 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology. Wachtel (1973b, pp. 537-540) now 
shifts from his earlier attacks and argues (1) Mischel's own 
research efforts from 1967-1972 are not significant because the 
rewards used in s>elf-control and delay of gratification studies 
were trivial (marshmallows, pretzels, etc.). He then suggests that 
(2) behavior therapy has not been "fully" successful in solving 
psychological problems. Finally, (3) Wachtel accuses Mischel of 
shifting from an attack on psychodynamic theories to an interactive 
view of personality and situations. 
Mischel (1973b, pp. 541-542) responds to the attack by 
remarking that whether or not his own research is relevant to the 
complexities of real situations should be judged on grounds other 
than what sort of gratification was used, Secondly, he agrees that 
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behavior therapy is not problem-f'ree and denies that that was ever 
his poirrt, Finally, he is able to show that throughout his writing 
from 1968, his primary at.tack on psychodynamic trait theories is 
directed at their la.ck of demonstrable utility. 
By way of reaction to this whole discussion between Wachtel 
and Mischel we might note that Mischel appears able not only to 
answer each attack with empirical data and arguments, but he is 
also able to show in most cases that the attacks were pre-empted by 
his earlier writing and analysis, The "rebuttal" by Wachtel is 
actually not a rebuttal (since his earlier arguments are not 
extended beyond Mischel's strong initial reply) but rather a shift 
from arguments Mischel has answered to new arguments which are run 
very superficially and briefly. But Wachtel does touch on something 
about Mischel's 1968 Personality and Assessment which may explain 
some of the debate. If there is a stronger emphasis in that work 
between attacking psychodynamic theory and showing how psycho-
dynamic insights may usefully interact with adequate appraisals of 
psychological situations, the emphasis is on the former. My own 
impression of Mischel from 1968 to 1973 is that there is a shift in 
tone if not strict content which seems more amenable to the possibility 
that psychological traits may ultimately survive their currently demon-
strated low correlations with predicted behavior and provide person-
ality variables which may interact significantly with situations. 
Wachtel's attack on Mischel's own research gives no cogent 
reason for his conclusion that the studies do not bear on complex 
behavior, but there is some truth in what he says. Whereas lli.schel 
believes that subjects must be asked by experimenters to indicate 
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which stimuli or cues are important and how important they are, his 
own studies on delay of gratification do not indicate very clearly 
whether this was done. On the other hand, Mischel does indicate 
(Mischel, Ebbesen, Zeiss, 1972) that in one study where the rewards 
were marshmallows and pretzels that the subjects (children) were 
interviewed prior to the experiment and it was determined that these 
were very important to them as sources of gratification. Nevertheless 
the sort of research Mischel envisions (research in which the subject 
plays an integral part in the assessing of his own constructs) is not 
widely reported as yet. 
E. ! Critique of The Social Learning Model 
1. The Problem of Assessing Situation. Adinolfi (1971, pp. 
167-176) remarks that the social behavior (social learning) theory 
of Mischel only assumes that stimulus conditions which elicit subject 
behavior can be more objectively and accurately assessed than the 
traits which Mischel challenges. This offhand criticism actually 
deserves a detailed response, On one level, it is easy to answer, 
because Mischel's model does not rely ultimately on a researcher's 
or observer's appraisal of a situation; ideally the subject or client 
is himself asked to tell the researcher what it is about the situation 
which is relevant and significant. But the answer is not that simple, 
for Adinolfi has perhaps unwittingly touched on what appears to be an 
inconsistency borne out in our review of Mischel's theory, relative 
to who assesses situations. On the one hand Mischel seems to believe, 
as Adinolfi suggests, that situations can be assessed by observers, 
as when he talks about situations having a quality of powerfulness and 
lack of ambiguity (Mischel, 197Jc, p. 277). On the other, he clearly 
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argues for a process of assessing situations in which subjects are 
the judges {Mischel, 1973c, p. 261). An answer to this problem 
relates to a broad area of criticism which we consider now: has 
social behavior theory abandoned. the study of persons for an exces-
sively mechanistic study of situa,tions? In answering that question 
we shall also confront the issue of who is the assessor of situation, 
the experimenter or the subject. 
We shall first consider arguments that Mischel's position 
is a personality-less theory with overemphasis on situational control 
of behavior, and second, the question of who assesses situation. 
The -argument that Mischel is talking not about personality 
but only about situations is very briefly implied by Adelson (1969, 
pp. 217-2.52) who believes that Mischel is really talking about 
"transient states" rather than personality. 
A similar criticism of Mischel is levelled by several other 
respondents, particularly Bowers (1973, pp. 307-336) who casts 
Mischel in a position he describes as "situationist;" situationism 
being a school of thought embracing the idea that "causal or con-
trolling variables a.re generally exterior to the behaving organism" 
{Bowers, 1973, p. 308). Recognizing that situationists vary as to 
the degree that internal factors (such as meaning) mediate the 
stimulus-response relationship, Bowers believes that Mischel empha-
sizes situational determinants sufficiently to put him at the right 
of this school, and a speech by Mischel is quoted in which he states 
that behavior is "utterly dependent" on situations (Bowers, 1973, 
p. J08). Bowers believes that situationism has provided a corrective 
to trait psychology and has made significant contributions to clinical 
practice. But he believes it is an inadequate view of man and man's 
personality. Bowers reviews several research reports which compare 
variance from situations and subject variables and notes that the 
largest variance comes from person X situation interactions. As an 
alternative paradigm, the author suggests what--he calls an 
"interactionist" view which has it that "situations are as much a 
function of the person as the person's behavior is a function of the 
situation" (Bowers, 1973, p. 327), Citing diverse sources of 
research, Bowers notes that situations are ,construed by subjects 
in ways that are unique to and characteristic of each. The author 
argues for a research paradigm which recognizes not only the influence 
of situational factors but the individual differences with which 
people construe and respond to those factors. 
A similar suggestion has been urged by Endler (1973, pp. 287-
303) who believes that the interactionist approach is one which will 
do justice to "the relative contribution of situations and individual 
differences to behavioral variances" (Endler, 1973, p. 300). 
In his 1973 response to critics of the "cognitive social 
learning" paradigm, Mischel (1973c, pp. 254 ff,) denies that he has 
ever taken a radical situationist position or a personality-less view 
of man. He points to the 1968 Personality and Assessment and particu-
larly the chapter "Principles of Social Behavior" (Mischel, 1968, pp. 
149 ff,) in which he develops the idea of behaviors as learned accord-
ing to principles from social learning theory. These principles 
include "observational learning," "vicarious conditioning," and 
"self-administered response consequences." It is this same social 
learning theory which Bowers points to approvingly as a more moderate 
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form of situationism than Mischel's (Bowers, 1973, p. 308). But 
there really is an end to the dispute with Mischel's .,Toward a 
Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization of Personality•• 
(Mischel, 1973c, pp. 2,52-283) because Bowers in a footnote reports 
that the Mischel article was received by him too late to be con-
sidered in his own paper, but he believes it represents a 
"clarification of the importance of cognition for social learning 
theory" (Bowers, 1973, p. 315). In fact the article probably repre-
sents a great deal more. As we have seen, Mischel develops a fairly 
elaborate picture of' how he views personality, including a set of' 
"person variables" (Mischel, 1973c, pp. 264 ff.). The article 
includes a discussion of how Mischel believes these person variables 
interact with situations noting: 
" ••• the person continuously selects, changes, 
and generates conditions just as he is 
affected by them The mutual interaction 
between person and conditions ••• cannot be 
overlooked when behavior is studied in the 
interpersonal contexts in which it is 
evoked, maintained, and modified" (Mischel, 
1973c, p. 278). 
This must be recognized as very true to the "interactionist" view 
espoused by Bowers (1973, pp. 307-336) and Endler (1973, pp. 287-
303). But in at least one important respect it is more an inter-
actionist view than either Bowers or Endler have taken, for Mischel's 
person variables actually comprise a fairly complex model (reflecting 
an extensive review of recent research) of how situations and persons 
interact. Mischel does not simply say, ..,Let's be 'interactionist,'"' 
he does the more difficult task of presenting a tentative, but 
sophisticated model which may enable the "interactionist'' approach 
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to be operationalized; something which the Endler paper (which 
suggests only paying more attention to person X situation interac-
tions) and the Bowers paper (which mkes almost no specific pro-
posal) do not provide, Ironically, this more thorough exploration 
of issues, review of research, and specifying of new research 
directions will probably mke Mischel even more vulnerable to 
criticism. But if he is at least partly right, he may continue to 
influence the course of personality study profoundly. 
In fairness to Mischel's critics in this area, Mischel's 
position as an "interactionist" or as one who gives importance both 
to persons and situations may represent a shift in emphasis. 
Mischel does not admit such a shift, but we may at least agree 
that his (1968) massive assault on trait psychology and his emphasis 
on behavioristic strategies for psychotherapy were not balanced by 
a fully articulated view of personality, until the 1973c article, 
I believe Bowers (1973, pp. 307-336) is correct in noting this shift 
in emphasis in Mischel's changing from "social behavior theory" to 
"cognitive social learning theory" as the preferred label for his 
model (Bowers, 1973, p. 315). 
2. The Problem of the Locus of Situation. A second problem 
in Mischel's conceptualization of situation is the question of whether 
situations have any significance for persons aside from their unique 
and idiosyncratic construction of them. As we have seen again and 
again, persons and situations interact in a mutual causality, in 
Mischel's view, and the experimenter must enlist the aid of subjects 
in seeing situations through subjects' perceptions, The problem 
arises when Mischel (1973c) indicates that experimenters' 
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knowledge of situations alone may enable predicting of behavior, 
provided. the situations are ·"powerful," the emphasis seems to be on 
the researcher's assessment of whether the treatment or situation 
is powerful. 
" ••• when relevant situational information 
is absent or minimal, or when predictions 
are needed about individual differences in 
response to the same conditions, or when 
treatment variables are weak, information 
about person variables becomes essential" 
(Mischel, 1973c, P• 277). 
Yet, again, it was argued at length that it is the subject's 
perception of a situation as "highly structured" or ••ambiguous" 
which determines whether the person variables will in a sense take 
over (in the case of an ambiguous situation) and predict behavior 
very much like "traits." And further, if person variables are con-
structs which, among other things, tell us what a subject is doing 
(cognitively) to the situation, how is it possible to make a clear 
distinction between a variable such as behavior outcome expectancy 
and the situation to which that expectation is relevant? 
This apP.l;l,rent inconsistency has considerable impact on 
Mischel's suggestions about how to do research. If situations may 
sometimes be objectively rated. by an observer or researcher as 
powerful or not powerful, then it is not necessary to argue that all 
personality research must enlist the aid of subjects in interviews 
and other self-reports in determining what situational elements are 
important to them. That would be true only in some situations; for 
those situations where it is not true, what we would really need is 
a research technique for isolating powerful situations from ambiguously 
structured ones. 
3. An Attempt at Resolution. I will suggest that this 
question may be resolved in one of two ways. First, perhaps Mischel 
does not mean that a researcher's knowledge of powerful situations 
will allow him to predict behavior, but rather that if the researcher 
lacks knowledge of subjects' construction of a situation, some situa-
tions are so obviously different that gross differences in behavior 
are predictable. This is another way of emphasizing that behavior 
is situation-specific. But the thrust of Mischel's position clearly 
is that specific predictions of behavior must be based on knowledge 
of how a given subject construes and interprets situational stimuli, 
and this knowledge (including ,whether a situation is perceived as 
structured or ambiguous) must come not from some gross assessment by 
a researcher but from the subject himself, 
Or second, the research Mischel cites in support of his notion 
that persons and situations interact (Mischel and Staub, 1965; 
Mischel, Ebbeson and Zeiss, 1972) does not indicate that the research-
ers interviewed subjects to ascertain their construction of the situa-
tions in which they were placed, Instead situations were manipulated 
in such a way that no room for interpretation remained: subjects were 
told they failed or succeeded; they expected further testing or did 
not. In these carefully controlled experiments there was little 
room for idiosyncratic constructions of situation. Perhaps this sug-
gests a resolution of the apparent inconsistency in Mischel's view of 
psychological situations. So long as research is conducted in care-
fully controlled settings, the experimenter may be able to argue that 
situations are presented unambiguously to subjects, and a.re thus 
"powerful" in the sense that no alternate interpretations are possible. 
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But as researchers approach Mischel's ideal of conducting research 
in the complex social settings in which people live and behave, it 
is increasingly necessary to enlist subjects in describing the more 
and more complex array of idiosyncratically meaningful variables. 
These attempts to resolve the apparent inconsistency leaves 
some problems unanswered, however. If either or both of the above 
interpretations is/are correct, why must Mischel talk about 
"interactions" between situations and person variables at all'? If 
it is supremely important in personality research to determine how 
subjects interpret situations, what sense does it make to speak of 
situations as though they existed independently of their construc-
tion by persons'? It seems to me that Mischel's massive case for a 
new paradigm in personality argues (by implication) that for practi-
cal and operational reasons in research, situations do not exist 
outside the idiosyncratic constructions of subjects, As Mischel 
has developed the argument, this would appear to be the preeminent 
reason for enlisting the aid of subjects in determining what situa-
tional stimuli and manipulations are important or relevant to them. 
Use of what Mischel calls "actuarial data" (which may allow us to 
predict, for example, that most post-hospital mental patients 
improve more rapidly in the community with jobs and family support 
than in institutions) may provide some opportunity for the researcher 
to make grossly general predictions without knowledge of person 
variables, but such data does very little to enable prediction and 
control of the behavior of individuals, Closely controlled and cir-
cumscribed laboratory experiments may, indeed, require less partici-
pation of subjects in defining situations, but one does not proceed 
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very far in the direction of experimental realism or settings out-
side laboratories before this caveat must be disregarded, Ung_ues-
tionably, it is consistent with Mischel's central focus to abandon 
the notion of psychological situations existing independent of 
subjects' views of them. 
4. An Interpretation. I would finally offer a speculative 
footnote to this discussion of the locus of situation. Mischel 
believes that some of the criticism of his theory may be motivated 
by its potential for providing a "paradigm crisis" (Mischel, 1973c, 
p. 254) in personality study, as indeed it may. We might speculate 
that his own unwillingness to argue consistently that the locus of 
situation is in subjects' idiosyncratic constructs may stem from 
something of a philosophical crisis of his own. A strict behavior-
ism, with its antecedents in logical positivism, is comfortable with 
the notion of behavior control through manipulation of situation. 
But if we are correct in saying that Mischel's paradigm implies 
that researchers must deal with situations only as they exist in 
subjects' "minds," then we have placed him, perhaps unwillingly, 
in a strongly relativist position which seems rather gestaltist and 
g_uite "cognitive." Mischel himself notes (Mischel, 1973a, pp. 342-
343) with some hint of trepidation that social behavior theorists 
and Rogerians (existential-phenomenologists) now share a discontent 
with dispositional constructs "about the~ priori nature of person-
ality," He is quick to note the essential difference, however: the 
existential-phenomenological orientation posits man as being what he 
wills to be, whereas the social behavior (social learning) theorist 
"requires more specific causal analyses that link what the person 
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does and construes to the psychological conditions in which he does 
it" (Mischel, 1973a, P• 343), 
But in support of ou:r speculation Rotter (1975, PP• 56-67) 
flatly characterizes social learning theory as: 
"a molar theory of personality that 
attempts to integrate two diverse but 
significant trends in American psycho-
logy -- the stimulus-response, or rein-
forcement, theories on the one hand and 
the cognitive, or field, theories on 
the other. It is a theory that attempts 
to deal with the complexity of human 
behavior without yielding the goal of 
utilizing operationally definable con-
structs and empirically testable hypo-
theses." (Rotter, 1975, p, 57), 
The speculation may be quite wrong in the sense that Mischel 
may not actually feel uncomfortable at all on his dialectical bridge 
between gestaltist and behaviorist camps. As for the theoretical 
ambiguity we have ascribed to that duality, one might even say that 
a little ambivalence adds flexibility and resilience to a theoretical 
model which is largely untried. 
My own position is that it is most consistent with the main-
stream of "cognitive social learning theory11 to recognize that sit-
uations do not possess "power" or (conversely) qualities of 
''ambiguity" independently of persons' constructions of them. In its 
most consistent form social learning theory makes an absolute identi-
fication of situation and personal constructs; it is a model whose 
strength (philosophically, theoretically, heuristically, pragmati-
cally) is precisely that it takes seriously the interraction of person 
and environment. It is a paradigm which sees man neither as indis-
criminately responsive to environmental stimuli, nor as regulated by 
inner dispositions which produce totally consistent behavior; but 
instead espouses what may be the first radically interactionist 
or mediationist view of man in the modern study of personality. 
Not only do persons construe situations and mediate the impact of 
environmental stimuli on their behavior, but by behaving they 
influence and change the environment itself. 
III. RATIONALE FOR AN EXPERIMENT: DOGMATISM v/s SOCIAL LEARNING 
A. Interface of Dogmatism and Social Learning Theories 
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It has already been suggested that the social learning model 
and dogmatism theory are of significance to the study of speech 
communication, and that the way in which they relate would emerge 
from a review of recent literature in the behavioral and social 
sciences. I will now suggest some specific relationships drawn from 
the foregoing review. 
First, dogmatism (as conceived by Rokeach) is clearly a 
psychological trait (as conceived by Mischel). We have noted that 
dogmatism is postulated as a relatively stable and enduring feature 
of the structure of personality, influencing behavior across idealogi-
cal lines. From the history of authoritarianism and dogmatism we have 
seen this trait inf'erred by theorists and researchers from very 
diverse sorts of behaviors relative to ethnocentrism, anti-semitism, 
reliance on authority, resistance to change, party-line thinking, and 
so on. This trait is designed to predict accurately how people will 
behave in a variety of situations and that they will behave similarly 
in similar situations. Moreover, it is believed that dogmatism can 
be measured by using a paper-and-pencil instrument which is capable 
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of isolating not only the presence of the trait, but also carefully 
differentiated levels ef it, On all these levels, Rokeach and 
Mischel are quite evidently speaking of the same thing; dogmatism 
is a prtme example of a psychological trait, 
Second, Mischel's (1968; 1973c, pp, 2,52-283) challenge to' 
trait theorists and psychodynamically oriented therapists to demon-
strate the utility of inferring underlying dispositional tendencies 
from diverse behaviors is a challenge which advocates of dogmatism 
must confront as well. Because Mischel levels his challenge very 
strongly and because it is an issue relative to dogmatism which we 
have not commented on d:ixectly in this review, an examination of 
several possible responses to the challenge is in order, One response 
to Mischel might be that his challenge was issued in the context of 
his attack on psycho-dynamic therapy strategies which have as great 
a likelihood, Mischel believes, of harming clients and patients as 
helping them. Unless insights from dogmatism theory were to become 
integral in psycho-therapeutic practice, the challenge would not 
apply. But Miscfiel challenges not only therapists, he challenges 
the utility of the application of traits in general. Furthermore, 
dogmatism scores, if invalid, may cause as great a harm in improper 
school placement or teacher behavior based on ill-founded expectancies 
of Hdogmatic" students, for example, as would an invalid psychothera-
peutic method, And ultimately, the issue of utility can never be 
resolved until there is greater certainty whether a given trait or 
personality construct is theoretically sound and applied consistently 
with theory. 
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Finally, it would seem appropriate to test these two theore-
tical positions against each other in areas where each seems strong 
and where the two cl.a.sh most directly. In the case of dogmatism, 
this would be the prediction that high dogmatic persons'a.re resistant 
to new inf'ormation as measured by recall. In the case of social 
learning theory, the aspect which most directly confronts the com-
peting trait theory is the idea that differences in persons a.re able 
to predict behavior only in ambiguous or low constraint situations, 
whereas in unambiguous or high constraint conditions, the effect of 
the person variable or trait will ''wash out" as persons respond to 
the increased demands of the situation. 
Accordingly, this review of literature in dogmatism and social 
learning theory leads to several specific hypotheses. From dogmatism: 
1. In any situation where subjects are presented 
with information contrary to their belief 
systems, dogmatism will be a significant pre-
dictor of subjects' recall of the information. 
Note that this would not apply to inf'ormation from a perceived high 
credible source. 
From social learning theory= 
2a. In situations of low, medium, and high con-
straint where subjects a.re presented with 
information contrary to their belief systems, 
level of constraint will be the most signifi-
cant predictor of memory of contrary informa-
tion, 
2b, In a high constraint situation the ability of 
dogmatism scores to predict subjects' recall 
of inf orma.tion contrary to their belief systems 
will be ''washed out. " 
Note that 2b is an extension of 2a which suggests as Mischel 
(197Jc) indicates that differences in persons will predict behavior 
less and less as situations become less ambiguous or more highly 
constrained, 
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Chapter Three describes the design of an experiment intended 
to provide a comparative test of dogmatism and social learning 
theories, This experiment attempted to create both low and high 
constraint ( "weak" and "powerful,,. "ambiguous" and "unambiguous") 
situations on the assumption that if dogmatism theory prevails, that 
trait will predict behavioral differences in subjects in all condi-
tions, Conversely, if social learning theory prevails, dogmatism 
should predict recall only in the low constraint condition. However, 
in a situation highly constrained by Mischel's characteristics of 
situational strength, dogmatism should cease predicting recall as 
constraint "takes over, " 
CHAPTER THREE 
DESIGN AND PREDICTIONS; PROCEDURES 
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In this chapter we shall first describe the design of the 
experiment. The discussion will then specify hypotheses in terms of 
this design, based on predictions from Chapter Two. Finally, we shall 
describe procedures of conducting the experiment and strategies of data 
analysis. 
I. DESIGN AND PREDICTIONS 
The experiment was intended to test the possibility of using 
levels of dogmatism and degrees of situational constraint to predict 
subjects' recall of information which is contrary to their belief 
structures. Subjects were pre-tested for dogmatism; placed in experi-
mental conditions designed to contain high, medium, or low constraint; 
and post-tested for their perceptions of situational constraint levels 
and their ability to remember contrary information. Dogmatism levels 
were determined by scores on the Rokeach "E" Scale. Levels of situa-
tional constraint were defined in terms of Mischel's criteria: know-
ledge of appropriate behavior, knowledge of outcomes of the appropriate 
behavior, and incentive or reward for appropriate behavior (see 
"Procedures" below). No attempt was made to - operationalize Mischel' s 
fourth category of situational constraint, that of subjects' skills 
relevant to the experimental task, To summarize, the following 
variables were identified: 
- levels of dogmatism (DOG) 
- Designated Constraint Levels (DC) 
High Designated Constraint (HDC) 
Medium Designated Constraint (MDC) 
Low Designated Constraint (LDC) 
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- Perceived Constraint Levels (PC) 
Knowledge of Appropriate Behavior (PC 1) 
Knowledge of Outcomes of Appropriate Behavior (PC 2) 
Perceived Importance (Incentive) of Appropriate Behavior 
(PC 3) 
- Dependent Variable: Memory of Contrary Information (MEM) 
The following predictions derived from dogmatism and social 
learning theories were made with respect to the possibility of using 
these variables to predict levels of the dependent variable :MEM: 
Dogmatism 
1) As dogmatism scores (DOG) increase, recall of contrary 
information (MEM) will decrease in all situational constraint 
conditions. 
Social Learning Theory 
2a) As designated constraint (DC) increases, recall of contrary 
information (MEM) will increase. 
2b) As designated constraint (DC) increases the ability of 
dogmatism scores (DOG) to function as a predictor of recall 
of contrary information (MEM) will decrease. 
Ja) As perceived constraint (PC) increases, recall of contrary 
information (MEM) will increase. 
Jb) As perceived constraint (PC) increases, the ability of 
dogmatism scores (DOG) to function as a predictor of recall 
of contrary information (MEM) will decrease. 
Several comments regarding these hypotheses should be noted. 
Hypotheses 1) and 2a) are not necessarily competing. Trait theorists 
agree that persons respond to situational differences, but they would 
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argue that within a given situation dogmatism would continue to differ-
entiate among persons in predicting relevant behavior. Thus confirma-
tion of 1) and 2a), but not 2b), would offer support for the trait view. 
Hypothesis 2b) is an extension of 2a) and contrary to 1). Confirmation 
of 2a) and 2b) would support the social learning view of personality. 
Hypotheses Ja) and Jb) a.re parallel to 2a) and 2b) but with this 
difference: perceived constraint (PC) is a score reported by subjects 
on a post-test. Designated constraint is an experimental condition 
1 created by the experimenter. As we have seen in Chapter Two, Mischel 
believes that situations may possess a quality of strength or unambi-
guity, but he also argues that situations are construed by subjects. 
True to his ad.vice that researchers must find techniques and procedures 
for enlisting subjects' assistance in assessing situations, this experi-
ment asked subjects whether their perceptions of situational constraint 
agreed with the experimentally created constraint conditions. Their 
responses will be reflected in a numerical value of PC derived from 
the Post-Test. If DC proves not to function as a predictor of 'MEM 
{2a) and 2b) are discon:f'irmed), it is appropriate to ask whether PC as 
a de facto indicator of situational constraint has the effect hypothe-
sized for DC. From the standpoint of the social learning theorists, 
the confirmations of Ja,) and 3b) constitute the sine qua~ of experi-
mental support for the theory. 
To summarize in terms of this experiment, the trait view predicts 
that dogmatism scores will significantly differentiate among subjects in 
their ability to remember contrary information, irrespective of situa-
tional constraint. The social learning view predicts that as subjects 
are placed in conditions of higher situational constraint they will 
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respond less to levels of dogmatism and more to the demands of situa-
tional constraint. In the HDC condition, the effects of dogmatism should 
wash out as subjects respond to this highly constrained, 11unambiguous" 
situation. 
II. PROCEDURE 
We shall first present a brief, step-by-step summary of proce-
dures, and then further explain several of the design/procedural points. 
A. Step-.!?1:-Step Summary 
1. First, subjects were placed in one of three experimental 
conditions, designed to be high, medium, or low constraint situations. 
2. Subjects were placed in groups of eight to ten; each subject 
was given a set of instructions corresponding to the constraint condition 
(DC) in which the group was to function. 
3. Subjects were instructed to read a case study of two 
divorced persons who plan marriage, but whose relationship is threatened 
by severe conflict. They were then instructed to discuss the case and 
five possible solutions provided with the case study. 
4. Following the discussion, subjects were instructed to write 
I down which solution each would select as the best of the solutions pro-
vided, and then to write several reasons defending the choice. 
5. Subjects were then instructed to announce to the other group 
members which solution each had selected and the reasons for it. 
6. Next, subjects were asked to consider (remember) a list of 
reasons in support of the four possible solutions which each subject had 
not selected. 
7. Finally, subjects were requested to return the instruction 
booklet and complete the post-test. 
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B. Subjects 
Subjects were undergraduate students enrolled in day and evening 
Speech Communication classes at Calif'ornia State University, Fullerton, 
during the spring semester, 1978. Each class was used as a separate 
subject pool from which subjects were assigned at random to one of 
three constraint conditions. 
C. Levels of Constraint .{QQ2_ 
Subjects were randomly assigned from each subject pool to one of 
three experimental conditions. The conditions were designated high, 
medium, or low constraint, depending on the kind of instructions pro-
vided each group of subjects. Mischel has defined situational constraint 
in terms of explicitness of instructions, subject knowledge of what 
behaviot is appropriate or required, subject knowledge of the outcomes 
of required behavior, incentives or rewards for required behavior, and 
the degree subjects possess skills necessary for performance of 
required behavior. All criteria but the last were manipulated as inde-
pendent variables in the three levels of constraint. 
In the low constraint condition (LDC, Appendix A), subjects were 
provided sufficient instructions to complete the steps of reading and 
discussing a case study, deciding on one of five possible solutions, 
announcing and defending their choice of solution, and reading reasons 
for solutions other than the one they selected. 
In the medium constraint condition (MDC, Appendix B), the task 
was identical to that of the other conditions. The level of constraint 
was increased by making instructions more explicit with respect to the 
criterion of subjects' knowledge of appropriate behavior. At two places 
in the instruction booklet subjects were told that their primary task 
was to remember reasons for solutions to the problem other than the 
solution they selected as best, 
In the high constraint condition (HDC, Append.ix C), instructions 
were very explicit with respect to subjects knowledge of expected 
behavior, behavioral outcomes, and reward incentive. First, in several 
places the instruction booklet reminded the high constraint condition 
subjects that their primary task was to remember solutions and reasons 
for solutions which they did not select. Second, in an attempt to mani-
pulate knowledge of behavioral outcomes, the instructions made it 
explicit that the post-test would ask subjects to recall solutions and 
their supporting reasons which were not the solution chosen. Finally, 
subjects were told that the group which scored highest on the recall 
test would be treated to refreshments by the experimenter, 
D. Post Test ----
The post test (Appendix D) consisted of two sections. The first 
section was designed to check subjects' perception of const~int levels 
(PC). Fach of the first three pages of the post test asked for 
subjects' perceptions on one of the three criteria of constraint mani-
pulated in the study, The second section was the test of recall,* 
*A series of pilot studies was undertaken to develop and refine 
these perceived constraint instruments and the instruction booklets. In 
the first pilot, subjects were asked to agree/disagree to a series of 
statements for each constraint criterion, These responses were factor 
analyzed, but no unambiguous factors of perceived constraint emerged. Two 
subsequent pilot studies were conducted asking subjects to make a multiple-
choice selection of judge-ranked statements designed to reflect constraint 
criteria. Each "right" statement was clustered with two "wrong" statements, 
and subjects were asked to select the ''right" statement from each cluster 
of three. For the criterion of incentive, subjects were asked to agree/ 
disagree with statements indicating that it was important to score high on 
the recall test ( "final test") which would follow, Through a combination 
of correlating scores on these measures with the constraint condition (DC) 
of each subject and extens•ive interviewing of subjects, the present form 
of the post test and instructions to subjects was developed. 
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As we have seen, Mischel argues both that situations may possess 
a quality-of powerfulness or lack of ambiguity and that situational 
characteristics do not exist outside persons' perceptions of them. The 
procedure followed here was to attempt to construct experimental condi-
tions with varying degrees of constraint, and then to check subjects' 
perception of such constraint on the post-test. 
Regarding the criterion of subject knowledge of appropriate 
behavior (PC 1), page 1 of the post test listed nine statements which 
had been ranked by three judges as to how closely each approximated 
subjects' primary task of remembering reasons for problem solutions 
' 
which had not been chosen. Three statements were judged as correctly 
closely approximating the primary task: 
1. "looking at points of view other than our own" 
2. "seeing how well we could remember reasons for solutions 
to a problem which were different from the solutions we 
chose" 
3. "gaining experience in evaluating reasons which support 
solutions I did not select" 
A score was assigned each subject on the criterion of PC 1 based on 
how many of these "correct" statements were selected. Scores on the 
variable PC 1 ranged from zero to three. 
Regarding the criterion of subject knowledge of behavioral out-
comes (PC 2), page two of the post test listed nine statements which 
had been judged by three judges as accurately or inaccurately represent-
ing what the recall test would ask (if subjects knew what the recall 
test would ask, they would know the "behavioral outcome" of scoring 
high on that test). The following statements were judged as stating 
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correctly what the outcome of appropriate behavior would be: 
1. "I will be asked to recall reasons which support solutions 
I did not select. " 
2. "I will be asked how well I remember reasons for solutions 
to a problem which are different from the solution I chose." 
3. "I will be asked to remember points of view which differ 
from mine." 
A score was assigned each subject on the criterion of PC 2 on the basis 
of how many of these "correct" statements were chosen. Scores on the 
variable PC 2 ranged from zero to three. 
Regarding the criterion of incentive, page three of the post 
test asked subjects to rate how important it was to them to do well on 
the recall test which they were about to take. They were asked to 
agree or disagree on a five point scale to the statements: "It is 
important to me how well I do on the final test;" and "It is not very 
important to me how well our group does on the final test. " A score 
was assigned each subject on this criterion (PC 3) on the basis of 
their responses to these questions. Scores on the variable PC 3 ranged 
from two to ten. 
Finally, the post test asked subjects to list solutions to the 
problem described in the case study other than the solution they had 
selected as best, and to list reasons for each solution which had been 
provided earlier in each subject's instructions. Responses to this 
section of the post test were scored independently by three judges. 
F.ach solution and supporting reason was worth from zero to two points. 
F.ach judge was to assign points on the basis of whether each answer 
closely approximated the substance of the solutions and supporting 
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reasons provided. The three judges' scores for each recall test were 
averaged to provide each subject a score on the variable MEM ranging 
from zero to 32. 
III. DATA ANALYTIC PROCEDURE 
The data were subjected to a multiple regression analysis (MR) 
method. This approach was chosen because: 
1) The MR approach is capable of determining amounts of 
variance accounted for by several independent variables 
which may not be independent of each other. In this study, 
it was anticipated that dogmatism (DOG), designated con-
straint level (DC), and perceived constraint scores (PC 1, 
PC 2, PC 3), might contribute to a predictor of the depend-
ent variable of memory (I\/JEM). The MR analysis provides an 
estimate of the amount of variance accounted for by each of 
several variables in the event that their independence is 
not demonstrable. 
2) The MR approach makes it possible to preserve the interval 
meas~ement of dogmatism; since alternative data analytic 
procedures would necessitate dividing subjects into arbi-
trarily determined levels of DOG. Thus the MR analysis 
method provides or preserves more information with respect 
to DOG, and eliminates the necessity of pre-assigning 
subjects to conditions on the basis of DOG scores. 
In swnmary, this experiment was designed to test the competing 
hypotheses of dogmatism theory and social learning theory with respect 
to subjects' ability to remember information which is contrary to some-
thing they believe. In the chapters which follow, we shall examine 
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This chapter will report data generated in this study and 
results of data analysis. In addition, these data and results will 
be related to specific hypotheses from Chapter Three. 
I. DATA FROM ASSESSMENTS OF DOGMATISM (DOG), PERCEIVED CONSTRAINT 
QQ.l, AND MEMORY (MEM) 
Dogmatism scores (DOG) are reported in Table I. Note that DOG 
is a pre-test score taken from subject responses to the Rokeach E-
Scale. 
Table I: Dogmatism Scores (DOG) 
S.D. Lowest Highest Mean Score Score 
All Subjects -22.276 27.0.52 -99 +57 
Low Designated Constraint (LDC) -19, 778 31 364 -60 +57 
Medium Designated Constraint (MDC) -28.871 29,400 -99 +23 






Perceived constraint scores (PC) are reported in Table II. Note 
that PC 1 is the post test score reflecting subjects' ability to identify 
the primary task of remembering information contrary to their beliefs 
(individual scores ranged 0-3); PC 2 is the post test score reflecting 
subjects' ability to recognize what the memory test would later ask 
(individual scores ranged 0-J); PC 3 is the post test score reflecting 
subjects' incentive for scoring high on the final memory test (individual 
scores ranged 0-10); PC is the total of PC 1, PC 2, and PC 3. Means for 
PC are shown by level of designated constraint; low designated constraint 
(LDC), medium designated constraint (:MDC), and high designated constraint 
(HDC). 
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Table II: Perceived Constraint by DC Level 
Criterion DC 
Variable Level Mean S.D N D.F. F Significance 
PC LDC 8,278 1.684 36 
Mean, all 
s's= MDC 8.452 2.567 31 2/102 18.135 ).001 
9.305 
HDC 10.974 2.150 38 
PC 1 LDC .972 .696 36 
Mean, all 
s's= MDC .903 .597 
1.229 
31 2/102 14,326 ).001 
HDC 1.737 .860 38 
PC 2 LDC ,806 1.037 36 
Mean, all 
s's= MDC 1.613 1.230 
1.686 
31 2/102 27.000 ).001 
I HDC 2.579 .858 38 
PC 3 LDC 6.500 L682 36 
Mean, all 
2/102 Not s's= MDC 5.935 1.750 31 1.698 Significant 6.390 
HDC 6.658 1.615 38 
Memory (MEM) scores are reported in Table III. Note that memory 
is the dependent variable; it is a post test score of the number of 
correct case solutions and supporting reasons (other than the solution 
selected by each subject). Individual scores range 0-32 (0-2 for ea.ch 
solution and reason). Fach memory test was scored by three raters; each 
individual MEM score is an average of the three raters' assessments. 
Table III: Memory Scores (MEM) 
Mean s.D. N 
All Subjects 14.460 6.147 105 
Low Designated Constraint (LDC) 12.556 3.908 
Medium Designated Constraint (MDC) 12.559 5.462 
High Designated Constraint (HDC) 17,816 7.032 
What follows is results of analyses of the above data. 
II. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
A. Correlations Among Variables 
Correlations among all variables (Subject N = 105) are 






Table rv: Correlation Among Variables 
Correlation Level of Significance 
MEM: 
MEM X DOG -,054 N. S. 
MEM X DC .363 ) . 001 
MEM X PC .444 ),001 
DC: 
DC X DOG .087 N. S. 
DC X PC .464 ).001 
DC X MEM .363 ).001 
DOG: 
DOG X MEM -.054 N. s. 
DOG X DC .087 N. s. 
DOG X PC .193 ).024 
PC: 
PC X DOG .193 >.024 
PC X DC .464 ).001 
PC X MEM .444 ).001 
B. Multiple Regression Analysis of Data 
Table Vindicates the results of multiple regression (MR) 
analysis of data from all measures. The table displays coefficients 
of regression (b), variance (Multiple-R), degrees of freedom (DF), 
amount of change contributed; then overall F, significance, and 
variance accounted for by all variables in the analysis (R2). PC has 
been separated into variables PC 1, PC 2, and PC J. The dependent 
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variable is MEM. 
Table V: MR, All Variables 
Variable b Multiple-R R2 DF Change Overall 
PC l .774 .249 .062 5/99 .062 
F = 6. 577 
PC 2 1.024 .)88 .151 5/99 .088 
PC :3 .947 ,455 .207 5/99 .057 Sig.= ).001 
DC 1.456 .479 .230 5/99 .023 
R2 = 249 
DOG - 0:325 .499 .249 5/99 .019 -
Table VI indicates the results of multiple regression '(MR) 
analysis of DC data. The depe'ndent variable is MEM. 
Table VI: MR, DC Only 
' : 
Variab;t.e b Multiple-R R2 DF Change Overall 
F = 1.5. 701 
DC '2.6,51 . 364 .132 1/103 .132 Sig. = ).001 
R2 = .132 
Table VII indicates the results of multiple regression (MR) 
analysis of data from measures of PC. The dependent variable is MEM. 
Table VII: MR; PC 1, PC 2, PC J 
Variable b Multiple-R R2 DF Change Overall 
PC l ,942 .249 • 062 3/101 • 062 F = 8,796 
PC 3 .866 • 3.52 .124 3/101 ,062 Sig. = ), 001 
PC 2 :i..517 . 4,5,5 .207 3/101 . 083 R2 = .207 
III. DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS APPLIED TO SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES 
Results of data analysis are reported in this section in 
response to the hypotheses of this experiment ( Chapter Three). 
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1) As dogmatism scores (DOG) increase, recall of contrary information 
(MEM) will decrease in all situational constraint conditions. 
This hypothesis was disconfirmed. No main effect of DOG was 
found on the dependent variable, MEM. Table IV shows a slight negative 
correlation (non-significant) between these variables. The MR results 
shown in Table Vindicate that DOG accounts for an insignificant amount 
of the variance in MEM, In addition, a separate analysis of the data 
in the low constraint condition produced a correlation of -.026 
(non-significant), indicating that there was no relationship between 
DOG and MEM in this condition, taken by itself, 
2a) As designated constraint (DC) increases, recall of cont:rary infor-
mation (MEM) will increase. 
There is some (very qualified) support for this hypothesis. 
Table IV shows a significant correlation between DC and MEM of .363. 
Results of MR analysis reported in Table VI indicates F = 15.701, with 
13% of variance in MEM accounted for by DC. But Table V results (of an 
MR analysis which includes PC, DC, and DOG) indicate that DC accounts 
for only 2. 3% of variance beyond that accounted for by PC 1, PC 2, and 
PC J. The data indicate some shared variance of DC with MEM and PC, 
but the only regression analysis results which confirm this hypothesis 
are those (Table VI) which ignore the ,impact of PC on MEM. 
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2b) As designated constraint (DC) increases, the ability of dogmatism 
scores (DOC-) to function as a predictor of recall of contrary 
information ('MEM) will decrease, 
Although the data indicate that situational constraint 
functioned as a predictor of MEM, this hypothesis could not be con-
firmed because in no condition did DOG function as a predictor of MEM. 
Ja) As perceived constraint (PC) increases, recall of contrary informa-
tion (MEM) will increase. 
This hypothesis was confirmed significantly. The correlation of 
,478 (from Table IV) indicates that PC and MEM share a significant 
amount of variance. Results of the MR analysis from Table VII indicates 
that PC 1, PC 2, and PC 3 taken together are able to function as a sig-
nificant predictor of MEM. Table Vindicates that these three dimensions 
of PC are, with all variables included in the analysis, the most signi-
ficant predictors of the dependent variable MEM. 
3b) As perceived constraint (PC) increases, the ability of dogmatism 
scores (DOG) to function as a predictor of recall of contrary 
information (:MEM) will decrease. 
This hypothesis could not be confirmed; there was no condition 
perceived or designated in which dogmatism scores predicted MEM. 
IV. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The data offer no support for the expectation from dogmatism 
theory that DOG would provide a predictor of MEM. The MR analytic 
method provides preliminary correlation figures which indicate shared 
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variance among variables, information useful in selecting combinations 
of variables to try in various combinations for regression. The 
correlational figures between DOG and MEM indicate that no combination 
of variables would produce results other than those reported here. 
The amount of variance in MEM accounted for by DOG is insignificant. 
The data offer very qualified support for the prediction from 
social learning theory that differential levels of designated constraint 
created across experimental conditions may be used to predict variance 
in a dependent variable such as MEM. But this support carries with it 
the qualification that measured levels of perceived constraint are not 
available or are ignored. I will argue in Chapter Five that these 
results are not necessarily at odds with social learning theory. 
The data offer impressive support for the social learning 
expectation that increasing levels of perceived constraint would provide 
a significant predictor of the dependent variable MEM. The corollary 
prediction that effects of DOG would wash out as perceived situational 
constraint increased, while not exactly disconfirmed, could not be 
confirmed, etther, since there was no condition for comparison in which 
DOG functioned as a predictor of MEM. 
In Chapter Five I shall offer an interpretation of these data 
and suggest where and how further research should proceed. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATION 
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This chapter will argue that the results reported in Chapter 
Four constitute significant support for the social learning "r,,concep-
tua.lization" of personality. It will then offer an explanation of why 
a more apparent comparison of theories did not occur in this study, 
due to the failure of DOG to emerge as a significant predictor of 
MEM. Finally, this chapter will explore implications for further 
research in personality. 
I, SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 
The data. which show perceived constraint a.s a. significant 
predictor of social learning theory offer significant support for 
social learning theory. 
The results of MR analysis reported in Ta.oles V and VII indi-
cate that perceived situational constraint PC functioned to predict 
MEM to a highly significant degree (F • 8. 796; Sig -= >. 001) and to 
account for 21% of variance, MR analysis results reported in Tables 
V and VI also indicate qualified support for the hypothesis that DC 
would emerge as a predictor of MEM (F • 15. 701; Sig • ). 001) and 
account for 13% of variance. This conclusion is, as we have noted, 
dependent on the absence· of da.ta on PC, or the choice to evaluate DC 
as a predictor of MEM without respec~ to PC data. 
But there is additional support for social learning theory 
here: the correlation between PC and DC from Table IV ( Correlation of 
PC X DC = • 464; Sig • ),001) suggests the possibility that the experi-
ment was successful in manipulating PC by creating lower and higher 
constraint conditions (DC). Additional qualified support for the 
success of this experiment in increasing PC by manipulating Mischel's 
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elements of constraint in DC conditions is to be found in Table II. 
Differences in mean PC responses from LDC to HDC are significant except 
with respect to PC J. The ability of DC to function as a predictor 
of MEM, as we have seen, was very limited. But social learning theory 
argues that situational constraints exist for subjects only to the 
extent that they are perceived to exist. Thus the indication from 
these data that perceived constraint (PC) varied significantly with 
experimentally created constraint conditions (DC) and functioned as a 
predictor of MEM is highly consistent with social learning theory. 
To sunurarize, the data confirm PC as a significant predictor 
of the dependent variable MEM and indicate also that PC may be manipu-
lated through the creation of conditions designated as high constraint. 
The data offer no support for the ability of dogmatism to 
differentiate among subjects with respect to their performance on the 
measure of MEM. The correlation between DOG and MEM (Table IV) shows 
no relationship between these variables; results of MR analysis (Table 
V) indicate that DOG is unable to account significantly for variance 
in MEM. Taking dogmatism theory at face value, it should have predicted 
MEM in this experiment if it were able to. And the most plausible 
explanation of why it was not able to comes from social learning theory 
which predicts that strong situations will overcome effects of dogmatism. 
Further, to claim support for social learning theory is consistent 
with earlier research on the relationship of dogmatism to recall or 
memory. As we have seen, this research found dogmatism inversely 
related to recall, irrespective,of source credibility or presence of a 
"yielding" component. The only plausible explanation for why the data 
from those experiments and the present study are different comes from 
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the social learning theorists' position that perceived powerful (high 
constraint) situations overcome the effects of traits. 
It should be said that the choice of the dogmatism construct 
provides a particularly rigorous test of the social learning model, 
Mischel recognizes that of all psychodynamically-oriented personality 
tests, intelligence tests (those dealing with cognitive skills) have 
proved the strongest predictors of behavior, Their predictions have 
been the least vulnerable to differences in situations. Although it 
is somewhat speculative to say that dogmatism is related to intelli-
gence, Rokeach (1960) bas indicated his belief that dogmatism may come 
to be recognized as a dimension of intelligence, It is not speculative 
to recognize that the dogmatism model is closely related to the whole 
area of cognitive skills, Thus, it would appear that in this experi-
ment the social learning model has survived a very rigorous test as it 
competed with a widely respected and carefully validated construct 
which relates closely to the area of personality theory least susceptible 
to the vigorous criticisms of the social learning theorists, 
One additional note: A casual examination of this data might 
make the results appear trivial in some sense that the experimenter 
told subjects what to do and they did itl To be sure, setting up strong 
situational constraints along the lines Mischel suggests is the equiva-
lent of introducing very explicit demand characteristics, And it is 
true that the trait theorist admits that persons do respond to situa-
tional ( or experimental) demands. What this experiment supports, 
however, is the hypothesis representing the core of social learning 
theory which is denied by the psychodynamic trait view: that situa-
tional demands of constraints may be experimentally introduced which 
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will overcome the effects of differences in trait levels of persons. 
II. EXPLANATION FOR DOGMATISM'S FAILURE TO EMERGE AS ! PREDICTOR 
There is a thorn in the rose this experiment seems to have 
presented to social learning proponents: the same experiment which 
successfully demonstrated that subjects respond to perceived high 
situational constraints in the way predicted, failed to make the 
desired comparison of theories which would have been evident had DOG 
proved to be a predictor of MEM in the low designated constraint 
condition (LDC). In other words, the data support social learning 
theory, but one wonders if the data disconfirm the predictions of 
dogmatism theory since there is no evidence in the experiment to show 
that the trait was functioning at all. 
There are several possible explanations. One might be that 
something about the experiment made it impossible for DOG to predict 
MEM. There appear to be two ways this could occur. First, it might 
be argued that the experiment itself failed to manipulate subjects' 
belief structures, that the reasons and solutions asked for on the 
recall test were not really "contrary" to subjects' belief structures, 
because they were not really committed to any solution. In retrospect 
it might have been useful to include in the post test a cross-check of 
whether subjects at that point remained committed to the solution 
chosen earlier. But lacking such check, the experiment very carefully 
operationalizes levels of commitment in a way consistent with cognitive 
dissonance research. There is nothing in dogmatism theory itself which 
would suggest anything other than the conclusion that when people make 
a written, publicly announced and defended commitment, this choice 
enters into their belief system. 
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Was the failure of dogmatism to emerge as a predictor of memory 
due to the non-objective post test? Almost certainly not. Note again 
the correlation between DOG on "MEM of -.054 (Table IV), and the corre-
lation of LDC of DOG and MEM of - . 026. These data might suggest that 
high dogmatic subjects remembered as much infornation contrary to their 
I 
belief system as did low dogmatic subjects, even where situational 
constraint was at its lowest. It might be argued that certain kinds 
of tests might cause high dogmatic persons to fear, resent, or rebel 
against the test itself and thus seem to remember less. But it is 
difficult to imagine the kind of test which by itself (and given the 
tendency of high dogmatics to resist contrary information) would cause 
high dogmatic persons to remember more than theory would predict, 
recalling contrary information as much as low dogmatic subjects, which 
the data above suggest. 
The only other basis on which one might argue that dogmatism 
could not function in the experiment is to admit that something inter-
vened to overcome the effects of the trait. But as a defense of trait 
theory, this would amount to a capitulation to those who argue that 
situations intervene to prevent the prediction of behavior by traits. 
Further, dogmatism theory would say that if the experimental manipula-
tion affects beliefs and the dependent variable is relevant, dogmatism 
must differentiate among the behaviors of subjects. 
A second possible explanation of the failure of DOG to predict 
MEM is that the experiment unwittingly created what Rokeach calls a 
"silver platter" condition, in which subjects perceived the new informa-
tion to come from a highly credible authority figure. In other words, 
if subjects saw the contrary solutions and supporting reasons as 
92 
originating with a high credible experimenter, dogmatism theory would 
say that the tendency of high dogmatics to accept uncritically anything 
their authority figures say ( "party-line thinking") would account for 
their remembering the contrary information as well as low dogmatic 
persons. 
There are several reasons why this explanation cannot account 
for the failure of DOG to predict MEM. 
1) Party-line thinking rests on the "perception of irrelevance" 
dimension of dogmatism. High dogmatics accept their authority-figures' 
ideas uncritically and come to hold contradictory beliefs because they 
fail to see connections among them. But the theory does nothing to 
explain the situation when one authority figure explicitly refutes 
another, or when the relevance of contrary beliefs cannot be evaded. 
The silver platter or party-line thinking motif cannot explain how 
highly dogmatic persons can remember unavoidably contradictory points of 
view as to the solution of a problem. 
2) The reasons for contrary solutions given in the experiment 
are presented as reasons why "some people" believe each solution is 
best. Thus, the source of the information high dogmatic subjects 
remembered was not the experimenter, but "some people," probably not a 
highly credible source. 
3) Research does not support the party-line thinking hypothesis. 
The review of literature in Chapter Two points to several studies which 
find dogmatism inversely related to memory, even in the case of a highly 
credible source of information. 
There is a third explanation for the failure of dogmatism to 
predict memory in low constraint conditions which must be advanced: the 
9.3 
experiment merely failed to create a sufficiently low constraint con-
dition or situation. The possibility is provocative: it suggests that 
the low constraint perceived by subjects was only relatively lower, and 
that all conditions were higher in constraint than the "ambiguous" 
level at which differences in persons may function to predict behavior. 
Although it is impossible to prove this explanation, I will argue 
post hoc that it may be true, and is a plausible explanation of the 
experimental results. 
First, the notion that the entire experimental task presented 
subjects with a highly constrained situation which "washed out" the 
effects of dogmatism is consistent with some data (gathered earlier but 
not reported*) from a version of this experiment which failed due to 
subjects' inability or refusal to complete the task. I concluded at 
the time that this attempt to run the experiment had failed because 
Mischel's advice about embedding behavioral research in the context of 
environments and situations familiar to subjects had not been taken 
*An early attempt to run the experiment using about 150 subjects 
from a non-univer~ity community group produced some data, but this data 
was judged to be untrustworthy because: (1) Leaders of the community 
group were used as facilitators in each cell of subjects; these facili-
tators' behavior varied widely in each group from "spoon-feeding" inf'or-
mation to subjects, to (in one case) highly vocal attacks on the experi-
ment itself' with the result that subjects in this group refused to com-
plete the task and post test. (2) Out of a pre-tested population of 
150, fewer than 50 were in attendance the night of the experiment. (3) 
Following the experiment several subjects indicated that the assistant 
who had administered the pre-test used the term '1personality" with 
respect to the test. Subjects reported considerable anxiety about 
whether the experiment might indicate something good or bad about their 
personalities. 
For these reasons the data from these subjects are not reported. 
The value of this experience was that several procedural changes were 
made in conducting the second run of the experiment. 
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seriously enough. Although it would be inappropriate to rely on such 
suspect data, it did occur to me that it would be interesting to 
reexamine the data for any indication in it that my speculation about 
the relative ambiguity of the earlier experimental setting was correct. 
Appendix E displays the results of MR analysis of DOG"with the 
dependent variable :MEM from the earlier version of the experiment. In 
addition, it compares data regarding PC and DOG between the earlier 
version and the present version of the experiment. DOG emerges as a 
predictor of MEM in the earlier version (F = 5,659; Sig= >.02) account-
ing for 11% of variance. Comparisons of DOG scores between the two 
subject populations show no significant differences (even though one 
was a "community" group and the other a "university" population). 
Comparisons of PC levels also show no significant differences. 
These data, such as they are, do not offer a strong indication 
that constraint was lower, allowing DOG to function as a predictor of 
MEM. Neither DOG nor PC scores were different enough to argue for a 
difference in constraint. Yet the situation certainly seemed ambiguous 
for the earlier s~bjects (as I watched the experiment disintegrate 
that December night). A possible answer may lie in that seeming 
ambiguity. In retrospect, when the earlier experiment failed, I 
believed I had created a task which was too unfamiliar to these subjects; 
a task requiring skills of following involved instructions, writing 
ideas, discussing relative merits of solutions, and memorizing informa-
tion. Thus, I took the experiment to a group of university students 
for whom this is a more familiar task, because they possessed skills 
relevant to the task. To use Mischel's terms, the university student 
subjects' skills made the task (or situation) less ambiguous, and by 
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definition, more highly constrained. The irony is that by shifting 
subject populations, I may have unintentionally but effectively manipu-
lated the one dimension of situational constraint Mischel (197Jc) dis-
cusses which I intended to omit; the variable of subjects' skills 
relevant to the task. 
This explanation of why the present study failed to create a 
condition in which DOG might emerge as a predictor of MEM has implica-
tions for research in social learning theory which we shall examine 
below. For now, it is suggested that this explanation, while not 
supported by reliable data, is plausible and more consistent with 
theory than any of the others examined above. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
One very apparent implication for additional research arising 
out of this study is the realization that a comparative experiment 
which aspires to produce data showing a trait at work in one condition 
and situational constraints overcoming the effects of the trait in 
another condition may be very difficult to design. Mischel's advice 
to do research which is embedded in contexts subjects find familiar, 
' makes such aspirations difficult. If an experiment is to create both 
an ambiguous (low constraint) and an unambiguous (high constraint) 
situation for purposes of comparison, it must have one foot in and the 
other out of these "familiar contexts. " If I am correct a bout the 
' 
differences in perceptions of this experiment between two subject popu-
lations, taking the same experiment from one group (for whom it is 
, 
unfamiliar) across town to another group (for whom it is more fam~liar) 
may effectively alter the entire experiment from a "low constraint" to 
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a "high constraint" condition. 
Further, the experimenter who would seek to create for a 
subject population both low and high constraint conditions appears 
faced with the necessity either of finding some way to manipulate 
subjects' skills {relevant to the experimental task), or else find-
ing subjects whose relevant skills are very homogeneous. otherwise 
the researcher faces the likelihood of subjects' differences in 
relevant skills cancelling out their perception of other constraint 
dimensions. 
On the other hand, if comparative experiments testing' com-
peting orientations are important, other studies similar to this one 
should be conducted using other personality variables. It may be that 
dogmatism is somehow atypical of personality traits and rather more 
-'-. vulnerable to situational demands than other traits, instead of less 
so, as I have argued. It may be that a population of university 
students is more accustomed to responding to the constraints of the 
university than subjects who are freer to fall back on past consistent 
behavior patterns due to their not being in school. This eventuality 
would suggest also redesigning the present experiment to adapt to non-
university subjects. 
Taking a longer view, some issues the present study does not 
address are waiting for experimental examination. Mischel's entire 
"reconceptualization" of personality into "person variables" {which are 
intended to represent subjects' styles of interpreting situations) is 
untested. The provocative possibility of identifying "equivalence 
classes" of situations would be a valuable contribution to research 
design: such equivalent situations would make advance estimates of 
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situational strength more nearly within reach than the present social 
I 
learning model allows. The mod.el now affirms the idiosyncratic nature 
of persons' perception of situations, but offers little that would 
help the experimenter deal with that reality (except for Mischel's 
advice that we must all lower our sights and predict the behavior of 
one subject at a time, since each person imposes his private reality 
on the experimenter's conditions). Such "equivalence classes" of 
situations might be an area of personality study especially suited to 
researchers in speech communication, since communication settings and 
arenas have been and are classified as to types, special constraints, 
particular behavioral predictions, etc. 
On the other hand, Mischel points to behavioral studies which 
are far more accurate because they enlist the assistance and under-
standing of subjects in a one-to-one or one-to-few relationship with 
the experimenter. The methodological technology for such research 
should be a primary goal for future study. It may be that the field 
of speech communication could pursue this goal in the area of communica-
tion anxiety whe~e more specific predictions and a much closer inter-
action of experimenter and subject in assessing and reconditioning 
situational cues would be of significant research interest and very 
helpful to subjects as well. 
'IV. ,CONCLUSION 
The present study offers evidence that some of the changes in 
orientation toward personality argued by social learning theorists 
may be in order. Our stereotypical judgments of' persons legitimized 
/ 
by tests which can give you the "inner structure" of' anybody who happens 
to have a pencil, our readiness to correlate personality traits with 
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any old message variable or dimension of credibility we happen to think 
of, and in general our understandable but somewhat reprehensible desire 
to have persons "pinned and wriggling on a wall" appears to be up for 
reconsideration, 
I 
If something like the social learning mod.el replaces the trait 
view, it probably will not simplify our task of understanding communi-
cation behavior, but instead. will very properly complicate it. Yet we 
in speech communication stand to benefit from it significantly. 
Among the benefits will be a view of man which points to a 
possible resolution of the current ambivalence with which we embrace 
both a radical behaviorist experimental methodology and a gee-whiz 
gestaltist attitude theory. 
We may be able to make a unique contribution to the view of 
persons and situations with insights into symbol-using as a significant 
"person variable" which structures and predicts how persons interpret 
environmental cues. 
And we may both contribute to and benefit from any acceptance 
of the social learning mod.el in society at large: if strategies of 
personnel selection were based less on who applicants "are" and focused. 
more on how people respond. to situations, the resulting greater emphasis 
in t:mining in the skills necessary for jobs might well place a greater 
premium on communication expertise. If government, education, business, 
religion should take seriously the realization that persons are capable 
of examining and remembering all information relevant to a decision, 
creating the situations which demand and reward such openmindedness 
could very well be the task and the contribution of people with 
speech communication training. 
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Finally, the social learning model of personality is a view 
of man which affirms that the questions of what a person is like and 
what the person's environment is like are really the same question. 
If this model is confirmed by future research it may prove to be of 
great value as an alternative to the more traditional western view of 
man-over-against-environment, It may promote strategies of educating, 
training, influencing, and healing persons based on changes in 
environments. It may offer an important synthesis in the continuing 
debate between Behaviorist and Gestalt-field learning theorists, and 
it may promote individuals' feelings of responsibility for their own 
physical and social environments. It is hoped that the data offered 
here in support of the social learning conceptualization of personality 
may contribute to and create interest in the task of testing and apply-
ing this important view of man. 
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BEFORE STARTING THE CLOCK PLEASE READ THIS PAGE 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for your help in this study. I hope we will all 
learn something important about ourselves from it. Please work your 
way through these pages, follow the instructions as you understand 
them, and follow the suggested times very closely. 
107 
P• 1 
Instructions: Please read and discuss the :following case study and 
the :five possible solutions to the problem it presents. Do not ---
announce which solution you pre:fer at this time. The discussion 
may :focus on anything else about the case you would like, such as 




THE CASE STUDY 
Joan, a divorcee with one child, and Bob, a widower with two 
children, have been dating steadily for six months. From the beginning 
of their relationship, they discussed marriage--first abstractly and 
then in very personal terms. Without any real formal discussion they 
began to move toward marriage gradually. They looked for and found a 
home, they prepared their children, they put both their homes up for 
sale, got rid of excess furnishings, told their friends, ordered invi-
tations, and made all the plans for marriage. 
But two weeks before the marriage, with Bob's home sold, Joan's 
in escrow, and a down payment made on a new home, they began to have 
problems. It became more and more difficult to make the decisions and 
plans necessary for the merging of their families. They began to dis-
agree on important things such as whether Joan would work, who would 
handle the money, what they could and could not invest in. There were 
arguments about styles of rearing children and public vs. private schools. 
These conflicts began to give Joan and Bob new insights and 
knowledge of each other. But with the new knowledge came uncertainty 
about their plans. Both Joan and Bob began to have some serious doubts. 
During one particularly bitter disagreement (whether they should change 
the size of the down payment on their new home) Bob poured out his 
doubts to Joan. He told her of his fears that their differences might 
lead to unhappiness in their marriage. Joan then admitted that she was 
worried too, so they discussed it all until late into the evening. At 
the end of the evening they agreed to continue with their plans because 
their love and knowledge of these differences could "surely help." 
But Joan continued to be nagged by doubts. She kept quiet 
about it however, because she feared the "mess" that would result if 
they cancelled all their plans •.• the losses they would take in their 
real estate transactions, the announcements to their friends and family, 
the legal entanglements resulting from Bob's home already being sold. 
Bob had lingering doubts too, but seemed reassured by their discussion, 
and thought that Joan seemed willing to go along with him on any major 
issues. 
SOLUTIONS 
1. Go through with the wedding and home purchase as planned. 
2. Continue wedding and home plans, but delay everything a month. 
3. Buy a home, but don't get married; just live together. 
4. Back out of wedding and home plans, but continue dating. 
5. End the relationship now, and pull out of real estate deals. 
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p. 3 
BEGIN THIS PAGE AT 8:15 
Instructions: Now that you have discussed the facts of the case and 
the five possible solutions to the problem situation, please choose 
which solution you personally believe is best. Your decision may or 
may not agree with other members of your group. Do not discuss your 
decision with other group members yet, If you wish, look back to page 
2 to remind yourself what the possible solutions are. Then write 
your decision in the blank below. Then, please write two or three 
reasons why the solution you chose is best. The solution you choose 
must be one of the five listed on page 2 of this booklet. 
Solution Chosen (please write in full one of the five possible 
solutions) : 




AT 8:20 GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
110 
P• 4 
BEGIN THIS PAGE AT 8:20 
Instructions: Now that each person in the group has selected which 
solution seems best to him or her, each member of the group should 
announce to the group which solution he or she chose, and state briefly 
what the reasons are for that choice. After each person has announced 
his or her solution and reasons, the group may discuss these choices 
as time allows 
111 
p. 5 
Instructions: The next part of your task is to consider the following 
reasons why some people might think each of the possible solutions is 
the best. 
p. 6 
REASONS FOR EACH OF THE FIVE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ---- -- -- - -- ---
1. Go through with the wedding and home purchase as planned. 
a. Any relationship is risky; this one has a good chance. 
b, Having been married before, they both know better how to 
make it work, 
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c. Joan and Bob's love for each other will ultimately solve their 
problems. 
2. Continue wedding and home plans, but delay everything a month. 
a. They still love each other but need a little time to settle 
their problems. 
b. With a later wedding date and less pressure, their problems 
will seem smaller. 
c. Both Joan and Bob need time to adjust to their increased 
knowledge of each other, 
3. Buy a home but don't get married; just "live together," 
a. They will see what marriage will be like without making the 
commitment. 
b. If they do eventually marry, they'll know each other better. 
c. Financial losses will be avoided without forcing marriage too 
soon. 
4. Back out of the wedding and home plans, but continue dating. 
a. They are not ready for marriage, but they have a good relation-
ship. 
b. The home deals will only cost money; a bad marriage will 
cost them each other. 
c. To their friends a good dating relationship is better than a 
broken marriage. 
5. End the relationship now and pull out of the real estate deals. 
a. After marriage it will be harder to solve their problems, not 
easier. 
b, Joan and Bob's problems are too serious to be resolved. 
c. It's better to be embarrassed now, instead of unhappy later. 
llJ 
p. 7 
BEGIN THIS PAGE AT 8:50 
Instructions: Please return this booklet to the enabler, then fill 
out a short reaction form. 




BEFORE STARTING THE CLOCK PLEASE READ THIS PAGE 
Dear Participant: 
Thank you for your help in this study. I hope we'll all learn 
something important about the way we behave in solving a problem, 
To give you some idea of what we'll be doing tonight, here are the 
steps to be followed: 
- First, read and discuss a case study and possible solutions to 
the problem it presents, 
Second, write down which solution you believe is best and reasons 
for it. 
- Third, tell other members of the group your solution and reasons. 
- Fourth, read and remember reasons given in this booklet for 
solutions you did not select as best. 
- Finally, return to the assembly area and fill out a short reaction 
form on the work you did in this group. 
This booklet will take you through each of these steps. Please 
follow the instructions as you and your group understand them and 
follow the times indicated closely. 
Again, thanks for your involvement tonight. 
NOW, AFTER EVERYONE IN XOUR GROUP HAS READ THIS PAGE PLEASE START THE 
CLOCK AND TURN TO PAGE 1. 
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p. 1 
Instructions: Please read and discuss the following case study and the 
five possible solutions to the problem it presents. Do not announce 
which solution you prefer at this time. The discussion my focus on 
anything else about the case you would like, such as clarifying the 
facts, pros and cons of the solutions, or any other aspect. 
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p. 2 
THE CASE STUDY 
Joan, a divorcee with one child, and Bob, a widower with two 
children, have been dating steadily for six months. From the beginning 
of their relationship, they discussed marriage--first abstractly and 
then in very personal terms. Without any real formal discussion they 
began to move toward marriage gradually. They looked for and found a 
home, they prepared their children, they put both their homes up for 
sale, got rid of excess furnishings, told their friends, ordered invi-
tations, and made all the plans for marriage. 
But two weeks before the marriage, with Bob's home sold, Joan's 
in escrow, and a down payment made on a new home, they began to have 
problems. It became more and more difficult to make the decisions and 
plans necessary for the merging of their families. They began to dis-
agree on important things such as whether Joan would work, who would 
handle the money, what they could and could not invest in. There were 
arguments about styles of rearing children and public vs. private schools. 
These conflicts began to give Joan and Bob new insights and 
knowledge of each other. But with the new knowledge came uncertainty 
about their plans. Both Joan and Bob began to have some serious doubts. 
During one particularly bitter disag:r:eement (whether they should change 
the size of the down payment on their new home) Bob poured out his 
doubts to Joan. He told her of his fears that their differences might 
lead to unhappiness in their narriage. Joan then admitted that she was 
worried too, so they discussed it all until late into the evening. At 
the end of the evening they agreed to continue with their plans because 
their love and knowledge of these differences could "surely help. " 
But Joan continued to be nagged by doubts. She kept quiet 
about it however, because she feared the "mess" that would result if 
they cancelled all their plans, •• the losses they would take in their 
real estate transactions, the announcements to their friends and family, 
the legal entang~ements resulting from Bob's home already being sold. 
Bob had lingering doubts too, but seemed reassured by their discussion, 
and thought that Joan seemed willing to go along with him on any major 
issues. 
SOLUTIONS 
1. Go through with the wedding and home purchase as planned. 
2. Continue wedding and home plans, but delay everything a month. 
3. Buy a home, but don't get married; just live together. 
4. Back out of wedding and home plans, but continue dating. 
5. End the relationship now, and pull out of real estate deals. 
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P• 3 
Instructions: Now that you have discussed the facts of the case and 
the five possible solutions to the problem situation, please choose 
which solution you personally believe is best. Your decision may or' 
my not agree with other members of your group. Do not discuss your 
decision with other group members yet. If you wish, look back to page 
2 to remind yourself what the possible solutions are. Then write 
your decision in the blank below. Then, please write two or three 
reasons why the solution you chose is best. The solution you choose 
must be one of the five listed on page 2 of this booklet. 
Solution Chosen (please write in full one of the five possible 
solutions): 






BEGIN THIS PAGE AT 8:20 --- --- --- -- ---
Instructions: Now that each person in the group has selected which 
solution seems best to him or her, each member of the group should 
announce to the group which solution he or she chose, and state 
briefly what the reasons are for that choice. After each person has 
announced his or her solution and reasons, the group may discuss 
these choices as time allows. 
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p. 5 
BEGIN THIS PAGE AT 8:40 --- --- --- -- ---
Instructions: The next part of your task is to read and remember 
some reasons supporting the solutions to tonight's problem which 
you did not choose as the best. For example, if you chose solution 
#2, your task is to read and remember particularly the reasons given 
for solutions # 1, 3, 4, and 5. 
p. 6 
REASONS FOR EACH OF THE FIVE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
1. Go through with the wedding and home purchase as planned. 
a. Any relationship is risky; this one has a good chance. 
b. Having been married before, they both know better how to 
make it work. 
c. Joan and Bob's love for each other will ultimately solve 
their problems. 
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2. Continue wedding and home plans, but delay everything a month. 
a. They still love each other but need a little time to settle 
their problems. 
b. With a later wedding date and less pressure, their problems 
will seem smaller. 
c. Both Joan and Bob need time to adjust to their increased 
knowledge of each other. 
3, Buy a home but don't get married; just "live together," 
a. They will see what marriage will be like without making the 
commitment. 
b. If they do eventually marry, they'll know each other better. 
c. Financial losses will be avoided without forcing marriage too 
soon. 
4. Back out of the wedding and home plans, but continue dating. 
a. They are not ready for marriage, but they have a good relation-
ship. 
b. T'ne home deals will only cost money; a bad marriage will 
cost them each other. 
c. To their friends a good dating relationship is better than a 
broken marriage. 
5. End the relationship now and pull out of the real estate deals. 
a. After marriage it will be harder to solve their problems, not 
easier. 
b, Joan and Bob's problems are too serious to be resolved, 
c. It's better to be embarrassed now, instead of unhappy later, 
122 
P. 7 
BEGIN THIS PAGE AT 8: 50 
Instructions: Please return this booklet to the enabler, then fill 
out a short reaction form. 




BEFORE STARTING THE CLOCK PLEASE READ THIS PAGE CAREFULLY 
Dear Iarticipant: 
Thank you for your participation and help in tonight's study. 
I hope that we' 11 all come to know some important things about the 
way we process inf'orma tion in solving a problem. So that you will 
know exactly what will happen, here is a schedule of the steps you 
and your group will take: 
8:00-8:15 Read and discuss a case study which presents a 
problem situation and five possible solutions to 
the problem. -
8:15-8:20 Write down which solution you think is best and give 
two or three supporting reasons. 




Read and remember reasons given in this booklet for 
solutions which were not the one you selected as best. 
Return to the main assembly area and fill out a short 
reaction form which will test how well you were able 
to remember reasons for solutions you did not select. 
There will be a reward for members of the_group who 
score highest on this reaction form. Please note: 
It will be very difficult to score high on the final 
reaction form unless the instructions in this booklet 
are followed very carefully. 
This booklet will take you through each of the above steps 
Wherever necessary, the group should discuss the instructions given 
in the booklet to be sure everyone understands them the~ way. 
Again, thanks for your involvement tonight. 
NOW, AFTER EVERYONE IN .!Q!!!i GROUP HAS READ THIS PAGE, PLEASE START 
THE CLOCK AND GO TO PAGE ONE 
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p. 1 
Instructions: Please read the following case and possible solutions, 
looking for any and all imormation which should be considered in 
choosing a solution to the problem it describes. Then discuss the 
case and solutions with your group. The discussion may focus on 
clarifying the facts, pros and cons of the solutions, or any other 
aspect. later, you as an individual will be asked to choose the best 
of the five possible solutions. DO NOT ANNOUNCE YOUR CHOICE OF A 
SOLUTION NOW, HOWEVER. 
Please Note: Your primary task in this study will be to remember 
reasons (given later in this booklet) for solutions you do not choose 
as best. Now please read and discuss the case and solutions. 
126 
p. 2 
THE CASE STUDY 
. Joan, a divorcee with one child, and Bob, a widower with two 
childr~n, have_been_dating steadily for six months. From the beginning 
of th~ir relationship, they discussed marriage--first abstractly and 
then in very personal terms. Without any real formal discussion they 
began to move toward marriage gradually. They looked for and found a 
home, they prepared their children, they put both their homes up for 
sale, got rid of excess furnishings, told their friends ordered invi-
tations, and made all the plans for marriage. ' 
. But two weeks before the marriage, with Bob's home sold, Joan's 
in escrow, and a down payment made on a new home, they began to have 
problems. It became more and more difficult to make the decisions and 
plans necessary for the merging of their families. They began to dis-
agree on important things such as whether Joan would work, who would 
handle the money, what they could and could not invest in. There were 
arguments about styles of rearing children an~ public vs. private schools. 
These conflicts began to give Joan and Bob new insights and 
knowledge of each other. But with the new knowledge came uncertainty 
about their plans. Both Joan and Bob began to have some serious doubts. 
During one particularly bitter disagreement (whether they should change 
the size of the down payment on their new home) Bob poured out his 
doubts to Joan. He told her of his fears that their differences might 
lead to unhappiness in their marriage, Joan then admitted that she was 
worried too, so they discussed it all until late into the evening. At 
the end of the evening they agreed to continue with their plans because 
their love and knowledge of these differences could "surely help." 
But Joan continued to be nagged by doubts. She kept quiet 
about it however, because she feared the "mess" that would result if 
they cancelled all their plans ••. the losses they would take in their 
real estate transactions, the announcements to their friends and family, 
the legal entanglements resulting from Bob's home already being sold. 
Bob had lingering doubts too, but seemed reassured by their discussion, 
and thought that Joan seemed willing to go along with him on any major 
issues. 
SOLUTIONS 
1. Go through with the wedding and home purchase as planned. 
2, Continue wedding and home plans, but delay everything a month. 
3, Buy a home, but don't get married; just live together. 
4. Back out of wedding and home plans, but continue dating. 
5. End the relationship now, and pull out of real estate deals. 
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p. 3 
Instructions: Now that you have discussed the facts of the case and 
the five possible solutions to the problem situation, please choose 
which solution you personally believe is best. Your decision may or 
may not agree with other members of your group. Do not discuss your 
decision with other group members yet. If you wish, look back to page 
2 to rem.ind yourself what the possible solutions are. Then write 
your decision in the blank below. Then, please write two or three 
reasons why the solution you chose is best. The solution you choose 
must be one of the five listed on page 2 of this booklet. 
Solution Chosen (please write in full one of the five possible 
solutions): 




AT 8:20 GO TO THE NEXT PAGE 
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p. 4 
Instructions: Now that each person in the group has selected the 
solution which seems best to him or her, each person should now 
announce to the group which solution he or she chose, then state 
briefly what the reasons are for that choice. later, when you go to 
page 6 your primary task tonight will be to read and remember reasons 
for solutions you did not choose: these reasons may be different 
from those presented by group members now, however, Now, the group 
should hear from each participant which solution he or she chose and 
reasons for it. After everyone has announced his or her choice, the 
group may briefly discuss the choices, as time permits. 
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p. 5 
BEGIN THIS PAGE AT 8 :40 
Instructions: By now you have read and discussed the case study, 
examined possible solutions, chosen and given reasons for one of the 
solutions, and announced your choice to the group, The next part of 
your task is very important: It will be very difficult to score high 
on the final reaction form if these instructions are not followed very 
carefully. 
On the next page you will find the five possible solutions with a set 
of reasons why each might be the best solution (these reasons may or 
may not be the same ones members of the group selected earlier). Please 
read these solutions and reasons very carefully, 
It is very important that you remember as mny reasons and solutions 
you did~ select as possible, because in just a few minutes you will 
be asked to answer paper-and-pencil ~uestions about them. For example, 
if you chose solution 1/!2, you will be asked to remember reasons for 
solutions # 1, h 4, and 5, and so on, Probably no one will remember 
all of these reasons, so just remember as many as you can. As an added 
incentive the group of participants who remember the largest number of 
these reasons will be treated to coffee and doughnuts by the experimenter. 
Now, please read and remember the reasons given for each of the following 
solutions. 
p. 6 
REASONS FOR EACH OF THE FIVE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
1. Go through with the wedding and home purchase as planned. 
a. Any relationship is risky; this one has a good chance. 
b. Having been married before, they both know better how to 
make it work. 
c. Joan and Bob's love for each other will ultimately solve 
their problems. 
lJO 
2. Continue wedding and home plans, but delay everything a month. 
a. They still love each other but need a little time to settle 
their problems. 
b. With a later wedding date and less pressure, their problems 
will seem smaller. 
c. Both Joan and Bob need time to adjust to their increased 
knowledge of each other. 
J. Buy a home but don't get :rrarried; just "live together." 
a. They will see what marriage will be like without making the 
commitment. 
b. If they do eventually marry, they'll know each other better. 
c. Financial losses will be avoided without forcing marriage 
too soon. 
4. Back out of the wedding and home plans, but continue dating. 
a. They are not ready for marriage, but they have a good relation-
ship. 
b. The home deals will only cost money; a bad marriage will 
cost them each other, 
c. To their friends a good dating relationship is better than a 
broken marriage. 
5. End the relationship now and pull out of the real estate deals. 
a. After marriage it will be harder to solve their problems, not 
easier. 
b. Joan and Bob's problems are-too serious to be resolved. 
c . It's better to be embarrassed now, instead of unhappy later. 
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P· 7 
BEGIN THIS PAGE AT 8:50 
Instructions: Please return this booklet to the enabler, then fill 
out a brief reaction form and a test of how well you remember reasons 
for solutions other than the one you chose as best. 
APPENDIX D: Post Test 
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***FINAL REACTION FORM*** 
Your Name ----------------
Instructions: Please answer all the following questions, one page 
at a time, Once you have completed a page of questions go on to the 
next page; please do not go back to pages which have been completed, 
and don't look ahead. Now, go ahead to the first page of questions. 
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reaction P• 1 
Instructions: If you were to describe to someone what you were 
supposed to accomplish in your work tonight, what would you tell 
him or her? Please indicate your answer by choosing the state-
ments below which come closest to what you would tell that person. 
1, What were you supposed to accomplish tonight? (Check one) 
gaining experience in solving a problem 
looking at points of view other than our own 
gaining experience in evaluating reasons for decisions 
we make 
2. What were you supposed to accomplish tonight? (Check one) 
seeing how well we could remember reasons for solutions ---- to a problem which were different from the solutions we 
chose 
---- weeding out false information from information we believe to be right 
---- gaining experience in looking at all sides of a question equally 
3. What were you supposed to accomplish tonight? (Check one) 
gaining experience in making a decision and sticking ----
----
by it 
demonstrating the steps in solving a problem through 
group discussion 
gaining experience in evaluating reasons which support 
solutions I did not select 
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reaction p. 2 
Instructions: In just a few moments you will be asked to fill out 
the final test which deals with materials from the instruction 
booklet your group used, If you were to predict what this test will 
ask you, what would it be? Please indicate your answer by choosing 
the statements which come closest to your prediction. 
Which of the following is closest to what you expect the final 
test to ask? (Check one) 
I will be asked to remember what steps we went through in 
arriving at a solution to the problem. 
I will be asked how well I was able to weed out false informa-
tion from information I believe to be right. 
I will be asked to recall reasons which support solutions I 
did not select. 
Which of the following is closest to what you expect the final 
test to ask? (Check one) 
I will be asked to defend the solution to the problem I chose. 
I will be asked how well I remember reasons for solutions to 
a problem which are different from the solution I chose. 
I will be asked to evaluate the various solutions to the 
problem. 
0_ Which of the following is closest to what you expect the final 
test to ask?"'" (Check one) 
I will be asked to remember points of view which differ from 
mine. 
I will be asked whether my decision in choosing a solution was 
influenced by others in the group. 
I will be asked how well I remember details of the case study. 
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reaction P• 3 
Instructions: How well do you expect to do on the final test? 
Please indicate your answer by narking your agreement or disagree-
ment with the following statements. 








Disagree Don't Know 
( or Neutral) 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
exercise made me want to do well on the final test. 
Disagree Don't Know Agree Strongly 
(or Neutral) Agree 
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FINAL TEST: HOW WELL DO YOU REMEMBER? 
In the spaces below please write as many of the solutions to the case 
as you can remember, other than the one you chose as best, For 
example, if you chose solution #J, please write solutions# 1, 2, 4, 
and 5, Then list as many reasons for each solution as you can recall. 
The solutions and reasons you list below should be those provided 

















APPENDIX E: Comparison of Data from an Earlier Version 
and the Present Version of the Experiment 
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MR Analysis of DOG and PC, Earlier Version, Dependent Variable= MEM 
Variable b Multiple R R2 DF Change Overall 
DOG -.060 .J41 .116 2/42 .116 F = 5.659 Sig=), 001 
Comparison of Dogmatism Scores (DOG) 
Earlier Version Present Version T-Test Results 
Mean -22.276 -15,222 
T = 1.296 
S.D. 27. 052 31. 922 
DF = 72.352 
Maximum Score 57 59 
Sig= N.S. 
Minimum Score -99 -83 ' 
Comparison of Perceived Constraint (PC) Levels 
Earlier Present F-Test Results 
Variable Version Version F D.F. Significance 
PC 8.711 9.305 1.786 1/148 .186 (N.S,) 
PC 1 1.178 1.229 . 117 1/148 .733 (N.S.) 
PC 2 1.600 1.686 .158 1/148 .692 (N .S. ) 
PC 3 5,933 6.390 2.074 1/148 .152 (N.S.) 
